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English Abstract: 
One of the main concerns within the field of economic history is analyzing and understanding 
how and why one part of the world got rich at a certain period in time while the rest of the world 
languished in pre-modern poverty. This study intends to expand the debate by analyzing the case 
of Japan within the framework of the California School, which seeks to reorient the study of the 
great divergence to Asia but focuses almost exclusively on China. If we accept the premise of the 
Californian School that Britain was no more advanced than other countries such as China in the 
early modern period and that her successful transition to modern economic growth was largely 
contingent and based upon escaping Malthusian pressures through colonies, coal and good 
fortune how, then, can we understand Japanese industrialization? Japan was in all likelihood 
even more Malthusian than either Britain or China, had neither the coal reserves nor the colonies 
of Britain, and yet managed to be the only country outside of Europe to industrialize prior to 
World War I. This study contributes to the on-going discourse by applying the Californian units 
of analysis to Japan in order to tease out what factors allowed both Britain and Japan to break 
through to modern economic growth while China, for all her wealth, remained a pre-modern 
society. 
 
Eine der Hauptfragen der Wirtschaftsgeshichte ist wie und warum ein Teil der Welt zu einem 
bestimmten Zeitpunkt reich wurde während die restliche Welt in vormoderne Armut weiter lebte. 
Die vorliegende Studie versucht durch eine Analyse des Fall Japans innerhalb des Gerüsts die 
auf Asien mit schwerpunkt China fokusierte Kalifornische Schule die Debatte zu erweitern. 
Akzeptieren wir die Voraussetzung der Kalifornischen Schule, daß Großbritanien in der Frühen 
Neuzeit nicht höher entwickelt war als Länder wie China, und daß ihr erfolgreicher trotz 
kontingenter Übergang auf modernes Wirtschaftswachstum großteils auf das Entkommen den 
malthusianistischen Druck durch Kolonien, Kohle und glücklicher Zufall zurüchzuführen ist, wie 
wird dann die japanische Industrialisierung wahrgenommen? Japan war in aller 
Wahrscheinlichkeit noch malthusianistischer als Großbritannien oder China, hatte weder die 
Kohlenreserven noch die Kolonien Großbritaniens, schafte es aber trotzdem das einzig 
industrialisierte Land ausserhalb Europas vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg zu sein. Um in diesen Dialog 
einzutreten und den Diskurs zu erweitern werden in dieser Arbeit die Kalifornischen 
Analyseeinheiten auf Japan angelegt um festzustellen welche Faktoren es Großbritannien und 
Japan zu den modernen wirtschaftswachstum Durchbruch erlaubte während China bei allem 
Reichtum eine vormoderne Gesellschaft blieb.    
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
The question of economic history, or more precisely divergent economic histories, has become 
an important and debated topic within the discourse of global history and in our understanding of 
the rich-poor divide which to a large extent defines the world in which we currently live. The 
question, of course, has and continues to be the following: how did some get rich while others 
were left behind? Was there something special about Great Britain that allowed it to break away 
from Malthusian constraints1 , while others continued to languish in traditional poverty and 
relative stagnation? What allowed some countries to catch up, while others were left ever further 
behind?  
 
 Much has been written about this topic, from the influential writings of Max Weber to the 
more recent publications of such leading scholars as David Landes, Kenneth Pomeranz, Andre 
Gunder Frank, and Roy Bin Wong. Much of this scholarship can be categorized into three 
schools of thought: the traditional school, dependency or world systems school, and the 
California school.  Landes, along with Weber, falls into the traditional school of thought which 
looks at Europe as unique and looks within Europe to explain the perceived “europäischer 
Sonderweg” through culture and certain aspects of the state supposedly absent in other parts of 
the world and, according to them, fundamentally necessary for sustained economic growth. 
Landes, in particular, cites democracy, private property and science as defining characteristics 
found in Europe but absent in what he calls “Asian despotisms”2.  In utilizing this dichotomous 
democracy versus despotism characterization, coupled with the fact that Landes devotes a scant 
fifteen pages to the Celestial Empire, it quickly becomes evident that, regardless of whether his 
true aim “… is to do world history”3 as he claims in the opening line of his book, in the final 
instance Landes makes very little serious attempt at truly writing world history.4  
 
 In response and opposition to this type of Eurocentric approach arose what is known as 
the California School of economic historians, in reference to the fact that most of them worked at 
                                                          
1
 Thomas Malthus, a British economist, theorized that as population increases, output also increases, but at a 
diminishing average rate. Malthusian constraints refer to the point at which population growth outstrips land 
productivity, thereby limiting the size and growth of the economy. For more on Malthusian theory, see Miller and 
Upton, Macroeconomics: A Neoclassical Introduction.  
2
 David Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations, pp. 31-2. 
3
 Ibid., p. xi. 
4
 This opinion echoes the critiques of world historians William McNeill and Andre Gunder Frank.  
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universities in California 5  These economic historians, among whom Kenneth Pomeranz is 
perhaps the most prominent, stress the need to “re-orient”6 away from the traditional Eurocentric 
approach to focus much more extensively on China and elucidate the contingent and 
circumstantial nature of the British industrial revolution. Pomeranz, in his ground-breaking book 
The Great Divergence, which has become a staple in the field of economic history, claims that 
China was just as, if not more, advanced than Great Britain leading up to the Industrial 
Revolution, thus making British industrialization hardly likely and certainly not inevitable.7  
 
 Naturally any investigation of the industrial revolution and its causes will deal, at least to 
some extent, with Europe and specifically with Britain. However, the work of Pomeranz and 
others has made it clear that British industrialization cannot be understood within a European 
vacuum but must rather be considered within the context of global conditions and interactions. 
However, while this reorientation has unquestionably enriched the debate and scholarship of 
industrial development, Pomeranz attributes much of Britain’s accomplishments to lucky 
happenstance, such as having coal8 in the right places and having colonies9  but neglects to 
explain how the rest of Europe or Japan industrialized.  
 
 Japan in particular presents an interesting case, being the only non-European country to 
begin to industrialize in the nineteenth century. While much has been written about Japanese 
development, the work of the Californians raises the question of how Japan fits into this concept 
of reorientation. If we accept the Californian theory that Britain developed due to coal and 
colonies and that China suffered overpopulation and resulting involution10, then how are we to 
understand Japanese industrialization? To what extent was Japan similar and yet also different to 
Britain? What about China? It is my intent to examine these questions, and to explore whether 
and to what extent Japan fits into the Californian theory or whether and to what extent it refutes 
the Californians.  
                                                          
5
 Peer Vries, The California School and Beyond: How to Study the Great Divergence?, p. 3. 
6
 Taken from the title of Andre Gunder Frank’s influential book ReOrient: Global Economy in an Asian Age. 
7
 Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence, p.16. 
8
 Ibid., p. 66. 
9
 Ibid., p. 264. 
10
 For more about economic involution in China, see Philip Huang, The Peasant Economy and Social Change in 
North China, pp. 69-218. 
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 In order to thoroughly examine this question, I will first concentrate on previous 
scholarship and lay out in detail both the traditional Weberian/Marxist approaches to economic 
history as well as the Californian approach11, delineating the particular economic or societal 
characteristics that are considered fundamental in the differing approaches. Within the California 
School, I will then analyze in a Japanese context the various arguments and critiques put forth 
regarding China. Japan, like China, was a rice economy with a large population, for the most part 
devoid of colonies or large coal deposits. 12  Why, then, did one develop while the other 
stagnated? In an attempt to answer this question, I will in chapter 4 first look at demographic and 
population statistics in an effort to determine the true extents of the Malthusian crisis with which 
Japan was faced. This analysis will also include considerations of Malthusian checks such as 
famine and disease as well as an investigation of farming techniques and agrarian conditions. 
Within the general category of land-resource restraints as posited by Malthus, I will in a sub-
chapter 4.1 take a closer look at resource use in Japan and consequently, the energy-intensity of 
the farming and mining sectors in the pre-modern and early modern economy.  
 
In chapter 5, the importance of empire and the extent to which colonies are necessary or 
helpful to industrialization will be assessed. This includes a brief sketch of British colonization 
and the integration of the American colonies into the British Empire, taking into consideration 
the slave-labor system as well as the central commodities of sugar and cotton. This is then 
followed up by a look at the Japanese imperial system and the extent to which the colonies of 
Korea and Taiwan were or were not instrumental to the industrialization of the Japanese 
motherland. Lastly, in chapter 7, I will attempt to determine any factors which may be missing 
from the Californian analysis which nonetheless may be prime factors in explaining Japanese 
industrial development and therefore might enhance the strength and validity of the California 
theory. In this, amongst other factors, I will look at the importance of the state, the importance of 
institutions, and the role of culture and technology in driving the industrialization process. In this 
analysis, I will ultimately endeavor to tease out the decisive factors that allowed both Britain and 
Japan to industrialize while leaving China to wallow in a continuously pre-modern world beset 
by Malthusian limitations.  
                                                          
11
 Vries, California and Beyond, p.3. The most significant writers within the California School are Kenneth Pomeranz, 
R. Bin Wong, Jack Goldstone, Dennis Flynn, Arturo Giraldez, and Andre Gunder Frank. 
12
 Pomeranz, Divergence, pp. 58-60. Japan did of course have colonies in East Asia after the Sino-Japanese and 
Russo-Japanese wars, the relevance of which will be later addressed in Chapter V.   
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2.  THEORY 
There is a long tradition of literature dealing with the divergent economic paths of “the West” 
and “the Rest”, stemming from the inception of the industrial revolution in England with writers 
such as Adam Smith, who still lived in a pre-modern world and did not anticipate the 
extraordinary changes which were arguably already beginning to manifest themselves around the 
time The Wealth of Nations was written in the latter half of the eighteenth century. Nonetheless, 
Smith’s writings, along with those from Karl Marx and Max Weber, form the foundation upon 
which later literature would build. These early writers, particularly Marx and Weber, wrote very 
much from a Eurocentric perspective, endeavoring to explain European (or British) superior 
economic performance by looking primarily within Europe for criteria that made the continent 
inclusive its British isles unique or more likely to industrialize than other regions in the world.   
 
 Marx in his various writings characterized the “orient” as stagnant and despotic, 
operating within a vaguely defined but supposedly primitive Asiatic mode of production. In 
contrast to this, the discovery of the Americas and the increase in the means of exchange and in 
commodities coming from Europe are heralded as watershed events that led to rapid 
development. 13  As such, a progressive and dynamic Europe is juxtaposed against an Asia 
characterized by stagnation and backwardness. To be sure, Asia, and especially China, had not 
always been seen in such a negative light. In fact, until well into the eighteenth century, China 
was greatly admired by Europeans for its culture of refinement, luxury and ingenuity.14 Even 
Adam Smith, writing in 1776, acknowledged that China was far richer than any place in Europe 
and he did not seem to anticipate any change or reversal in this relationship.15 Though Smith was 
not so critical of Asia and Asian methods of production, by the time Marx and Weber were 
writing in the nineteenth century, European attitudes toward China had changed drastically. 
Weber followed in the footsteps of Marx in championing European superiority and rationality, 
but expanded beyond the Marxist interpretation by conducting a comprehensive study of world 
religions from which he cites Richard Baxter and concludes that, amongst other things, waste of 
time through socializing or inactive contemplation was time “…lost to labour for the glory of 
                                                          
13
 Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, p. 9. 
14
 David Martinez-Robles, “The Western Representation of Modern China: Orientalism, Culturalism, and 
Historiographical Criticism”. In: Carles Prado-Fonts (ed.), Orientalism [online dossier] Digithum, No. 10 UOC. 
15
 Frank, ReOrient, p. 13. 
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God” in the Protestant tradition.16 By this he sought to define the relationship between labor and 
religion under the assertion that work and productivity were an expression of devotion to God 
while idleness, in any form, was time wasted from actively and productively serving God. Even 
worship and prayer on any day other than Sunday, which was specifically designated for this 
activity, could therefore be regarded as a sinful waste of precious time.17 Thus, for Weber, the 
Protestant ethic found in Europe was uniquely suited to capitalism and economic advancement in 
a way not found in other regions of the world.  
 
 This Eurocentric, Europe-as-unique interpretation of economic history has been the 
pervasive, predominant view of scholars of the industrial revolution. Writers such as Eric Jones 
and David Landes continue to espouse this view. Jones claims that in terms of standard of living 
and energy efficiency, Europe was superior to Asia already well before the commencement of 
industrialization.18 Landes, meanwhile, titles his chapter on China in The Wealth and Poverty of 
Nations as “Celestial Empire: Stasis and Retreat”, which is still comparatively optimistic in 
relation to his chapter on Muslim nations entitled “History Gone Wrong?”.19 Echoing Weber to a 
degree, Landes places great value on culture being conducive to innovation and invention and 
goes so far as to claim that for the last one thousand years, Europe (or the West) has been the 
prime mover of development and modernity.20 This belief in the overwhelming importance of 
Europe’s role in world history is not unusual; however, the claim that it has been so for the last 
one thousand years is perhaps a bit extreme. Such a time frame suggests that Europe in the 
middle ages was already more dynamic and involved in global processes than other parts of the 
world. Landes does not properly justify this statement but rather presents it as though European 
superiority were an accepted truth. Though these types of Eurocentric interpretations have lasted 
from Marx down to the present day, they have not been without challenge and dispute. Out of 
this tradition has grown a counter-response which seeks to redress the negative image of “the 
Rest” in much of the classic literature and re-direct the focus from Europe to Asia.   
 
                                                          
16
 Weber and Parsons, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, pp.  157-158. 
17
 Ibid., p. 158. 
18
 Jones, The European Miracle, pp. 3-4. 
19
 Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations. 
20
 Ibid., p. xxi. 
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 Though there are various schools of thought that counter the traditional, Eurocentric 
views including World System Analysis and Dependency Theory, the one of prime concern 
within this study is the California School. Though perhaps an imprecise term without wide 
recognizability, the California School essentially encompasses those writers who seek to explain 
not necessarily why Britain industrialized but rather why other parts of the world, most 
specifically China, didn’t. The predominant writers within this school of thought are Kenneth 
Pomeranz, Roy Bin Wong, Andre Gunder Frank, and Jack Goldstone. Other scholars such as 
Dennis Flynn and Arturo Giraldez can also be counted as members of this school. The primary 
focus of this study will however be on the definitive work by Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great 
Divergence, the title of which has become standard terminology within economic history. This 
fact alone conveys the importance of the work as well as the impact it has had on the field. This 
work arguably serves as the most balanced, clear, and comprehensive volume to be found within 
the California School and therefore also serves as the main point of departure for this study. 
Frank and Wong will also be referenced occasionally but do not serve as the focal point of the 
study in the manner that Pomeranz does. Though Frank argues very much in a similar vein as 
Pomeranz, he takes a more extreme view in entirely discrediting the idea that Europe might have 
had some advantages that other regions did not. As such, much like Pomeranz, he seeks to re-
direct attention from Europe to other regions of the world but is left in the end with the 
fundamental problem of convincingly explaining why it in fact was in Europe that the industrial 
revolution occurred. If Europe indeed remained a marginal player in the world economy even 
with its cheap and easy access to American money21, as Frank claims, it is difficult to reconcile 
this enduring European marginality with the later break-through to sustained economic growth. 
Pomeranz, though facing essentially the same dilemma, at least leaves himself an out through his 
emphasis on the exploitation of foreign ghost acres. Roy Bin Wong, on the other hand, directs 
his focus almost exclusively toward China in an effort to interpret state-making not only as seen 
from the European perspective but also to conversely examine the Chinese perspective on 
European state making. The question for him is not so much the change that happened in Europe 
but rather explaining the absence of change elsewhere while also challenging the western 
categories from which success and modernity are measured.  
 
                                                          
21
 Frank, ReOrient, p. 75. 
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 These Californian writers all take a somewhat different approach to the fundamental 
question of the diverging eastern and western economic trajectories. What ties them all together, 
however, is the preoccupation with understanding why China couldn’t break through the pre-
modern barrier despite her esteemed wealth and culture; or perhaps more to the point, why 
Britain did not turn out more like China. They also share the view that industrialization was not 
inevitable anywhere and was for the most part not more likely to occur in Europe than elsewhere. 
The acquisition and utilization of colonies is also cited by the various authors as a windfall for 
Britain that later translated into advanced economic growth. Though both Frank and Pomeranz 
devote some time to regions such as India and the Ottoman Empire, the overwhelming emphasis 
for all of the writers within the California School is on China. China seems by all accounts to 
have been the region most likely to industrialize on account of wealth and weight in international 
exchange.  
 
 Despite the central focus on China and the endurance of explaining Chinese non-
development, it was Japan that first managed to industrialize in Asia. To be sure, the Japanese 
case is not entirely ignored by the authors of the California School, but it is very much 
marginalized and never examined in any sort of comprehensive manner. The fact that it was 
Japan and not China that was able to follow the European lead in achieving sustained economic 
growth is a point that desperately needs to be addressed within the Californian framework. This 
study is an attempt to fill that gap in the existing scholarship. If the Californian theory intends to 
re-direct attention away from Europe and towards Asia, then some substantial account must be 
taken also of Japan. If China was much more fertile ground for industrialization, why was it then 
that Japan achieved this feat instead? To what extent did Japan differ from China? These are 
basic questions arising from the Californian emphasis on Asia which cannot be overlooked. 
However, it is important to note that this paper does not necessarily intend to comprehensively 
explain Japanese industrialization. The purpose is to apply the Californian Theory to the 
Japanese case and to determine the extent to which the Californian criteria are able to explain 
Japan as the first Asian industrializer. Though there will be some forays into providing a 
clarification of the Japanese case, the ultimate intent is to determine the applicability of the 
Californian framework to examples other than Britain and China. This study locates itself very 
definitively within the theoretical framework of the California School by re-focusing the gaze on 
Japan and applying the ecological criteria thereof in an attempt to understand the extent to which 
12 
 
these factors both differed in Japan and China as well as how necessary and sufficient they truly 
are in providing an adequate explanation for the pre-World War I Japanese success in economic 
growth.   
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3.  METHODOLOGY 
The question of Japanese development will be addressed in this study against and within the 
framework of the California School as detailed in the previous chapter. In keeping true to the 
main focus of the Californian theory, I will focus largely on ecological factors and the extent to 
which the Japanese population, resource distribution and land use compared favorably or 
unfavorably to Western Europe. These are the main factors in the California School analysis and 
they will therefore serve also as the skeleton of this analysis.  
 Within the field of economic history and in the context of explaining Japanese 
development there are a multitude of methodological departures one could take. Traditionally 
Japanese development and industrialization are said to have begun only with the Meiji 
Restoration in 1868, with the previous centuries of Tokugawa rule disregarded as a period of 
stagnant growth and relative unimportance.22  Although there was a significant break in Japanese 
history at this time, it seems rash to assume that Meiji Japan was able to industrialize without 
building upon the foundation of the previous era; an assumption which more recent revisionist 
scholarship has attempted to correct.23 As such it has become increasingly untenable to explain 
growth in Meiji Japan without taking into account the conditions which led to this significant 
break in Japanese economic history. 
 Methodologically the California School will serve as the backbone of this study. This 
provides not only a specific focus but will hopefully also add depth to the Californian theory, 
which has gained credence in recent years but largely neglects to explain the case of Japanese 
development. Within this framework, then, the units of analysis will closely mirror those units 
which receive the greatest amount of attention from the Californians: namely land-, labor- and 
energy-based analyses. I will attempt to address these same points in order to determine whether 
the Californian theory of development allows us a comprehensive understanding of Japanese 
development, which was in all likelihood much closer to a Malthusian ceiling than either Britain 
or China. Following this Malthusian analysis, I will then endeavor to provide a systematic 
                                                          
22
 Jones, Growth Recurring, p. 152. See also Kunio Yoshihara’s Japanese Economic Development: A Short 
Introduction or Sydney Crawcour’s “The Tokugawa Period and Japan’s Preparation for Modern Economic Growth”, 
In: Journal of Japanese Studies, vol. 1, no. 1 (Autumn 1974), pp. 113-125. 
23
 See Eric Jones’ Growth Recurring or Susan Hanley and Kozo Yamamura’s Economic and Demographic Change in 
Preindustrial Japan 1600-1868. 
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comparison of the respective colonies and the degree to which ghost acreage was essential for 
industrialization. 
 Working within this methodological framework, another important consideration is the 
periodization of this particular study. In order to study or compare the economic developments of 
various regions of the world, it is imperative to first ascertain the appropriate time frame for 
study and comparison. Different scholars have suggested various periodizations for studying 
industrialization and the great divergence. The question really is where to start. A somewhat 
different but not entirely unrelated question that is often raised is: at what point in time do we 
begin to see globalization? In order to answer this, we must first have a clear definition of what 
globalization is. Scholars such as Janet Abu-Lughod point out that there existed an international 
trade economy stretching from northwest Europe to China between 1250 and 1350.24 To be sure, 
trade routes and contacts between China and Europe were taking place already well before this 
time. The pacification of large areas of China and the establishment of the silk roads go all the 
way back to the Han Empire25; however, this was overland trade, which was necessarily focused 
primarily on high-value, low-bulk goods such as spices and silk.26 Other scholars prefer to start 
in the post-Columbian period, with the contention that from 1500 there was an international 
division of labor and multilateral trade.27 While there certainly was an expansion of overseas 
trade and an extreme increase in the distances traveled and contacts made, the post-Columbian 
period is still a pre-industrial period, meaning that transportation would have been almost 
prohibitively expensive for most non-luxury items. As a result, products traded were typically of 
high value and fairly easy to transport.  
 
 Arguing for even later periodization of globalization are Williamson and O’Rourke who, 
in their article “When did globalization begin?”, look for price convergence across markets for 
various commodities. They define globalization in classical economic terms to mean the 
integration of markets across space, and, according to their findings, real price convergence 
                                                          
24
 Kevin O’Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, “When did Globalisation Begin?”, p. 23. 
25
 The Han Empire lasted from about 130BC—157AD. For more information about the rise of empire and 
pacification of western lands, see S. Durrant, “The Rise of the Chinese Empire: Frontier, Immigration, and Empire in 
Han China, 130BC—AD157”, The American Historical Review, 113(3), p. 803. 
26
 Jerry H. Bentley and Herbert Ziegler, Traditions and Encounters: A Global Perspective on the Past, p. 290. 
27
 Andre Gunder Frank, Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment, p. 13. 
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cannot be seen prior to the 1820s.28 By this estimate, then, we cannot speak of globalization 
before the invention of the steam engine and the steamship. While this may be true, there were 
many contacts and many developments leading up to this period and, though there may not have 
been globalization in a strictly economic sense, the question at hand is how and why the steam 
engine came about when it did and where it did, along with why it could be quickly adopted by 
some countries but not by others.29 Keeping this in mind, it may be most instructive to look at the 
timeframe leading up to and including the industrial revolution in Britain, or what is often called 
the long eighteenth century, beginning in the 1680s and running all the way to the 1850s.  
 
The California School typically locates itself temporally in the long eighteenth century, 
though the exact dates that this term encompasses are not always clear. A central focus in any 
case is the examination of economies outside of Europe before 1800, the most dominant of 
which are claimed to have been in Asia.30 However, despite this claim, the heart of the argument 
lies in China with very little attention being paid to Japan. The emphasis on the year 1800 come 
from the central claim, voiced most prominently by Pomeranz, that Europe and China were not 
significantly different until this point in time and that 1800 therefore marks the point at which a 
true divergence began. Other authors, such as the institutional economists Douglass North and 
Robert Thomas, analyze only the underlying structures of the pre-modern economy and end their 
explanation in the early eighteenth century under the assumption that by this time the relevant 
institutional safeguards for industrialization were in place and further analysis therefore 
unnecessary.31 North and Thomas’s The Rise of the Western World, as already evidenced in the 
title, focuses exclusively on Europe, with chapters devoted especially to explaining the “also-
ran” cases of France and Spain, the successful economic growth of the Netherlands, and 
naturally the darling of industrialization: England. Economic growth is attributed to an internal 
dynamism in Europe which through population fluctuations and migration allowed ultimately for 
the institutional foundation and property rights necessary for industrialization to be laid, already 
in the eighteenth century according to North and Thomas.32 Such supreme confidence in the 
institutional building blocks suggests an inevitability of industrialization in Western Europe, a 
                                                          
28
 O’Rourke, “Globalisation”, p. 25. 
29
 Pomeranz, Divergence, pp. 61-2. 
30
 Frank, ReOrient, p.  5. 
31
 North and Thomas, The Rise of the Western World. 
32
 Ibid., p. 157. 
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position strongly contested by Kenneth Pomeranz.33  While my opinion aligns itself more closely 
with Pomeranz’s assertion that industrialization was nowhere inevitable, the question of where to 
position Japan within this debate remains. Indeed, as already mentioned previously, the 
Tokugawan bedrock is relevant and important, so I will include particularly the mid- to late 
Tokugawa period, starting with the eighteenth century. This brings up the larger question of 
where to end the analysis. It seems most conducive to continue the analysis up until the point 
where take-off had begun and the relevant elements to assure sustainability were in place. 
Though it is always difficult to locate any such particular moment in time, it seems that for Japan 
this would have been sometime in the beginning of the twentieth century.34 Therefore, although 
the California School typically extends analysis only until the nineteenth century, the present 
study on Japan will necessarily have to expand this analytical window to include the Meiji era up 
through the first decade of the twentieth century. By the beginning of the First World War in 
1914 Japan indisputably had embarked on a path toward sustained economic growth. By this 
time, Japan had successfully won two wars against major powers, had acquired Taiwan as a spoil 
of war, and had managed to annex Korea after a decade-long struggle to assert dominance. The 
First World War also marks a certain break in history which led to significant geographical and 
political changes, particularly in Europe; in any case, 1914 serves as both a logical and 
convenient moment in time at which Japanese take-off was all but assured and, as such, it will 
serve as the end date of our analysis of Japanese industrialization.   
Regarding the figures and statistics found in the following chapters, I have to some 
degree made my own calculations pertaining to population density and land availability. For the 
most part I have relied upon previous research and accredited statistics in providing figures 
related to demographics and population. However, in a few cases, the data available to me was 
not quite adequate for the argument at hand. One example of this is land area and population 
density in Tokugawa Japan. I was not able to find any conclusive figures for this so I made my 
own simple calculations using accepted population projections and the estimated land area of 
Japan, excluding Hokkaido (formerly Ezo) since it was very sparsely populated and not officially 
                                                          
33
 Pomeranz, The Great Divergence. Pomeranz asserts that while there were certain factors that may have made 
industrialization more likely in western Europe than elsewhere, these were largely contingent upon colonies and 
good fortune, and in any case hardly made industrialization inevitable. 
34
 Rostow suggests 1905 as the latest date by which Japan had clearly achieved the “take-off” stage in its economic 
development, as defined in The Stages of Economic Growth by W.W. Rostow. The legitimacy of this date will be 
further discussed in chapter 7. 
17 
 
a part of Japan at the historic time in question. Including the Hokkaido landmass would result in 
a downward skew of the population density and would therefore paint an inaccurate picture of 
the labor-land ratio and the seriousness of the Malthusian pressures that Japan faced in the pre-
modern era. Where calculations have been made, the calculation methodology and the sources 
upon which these calculations are based are clearly indicated such that the reader may judge their 
validity.  
The research methodology will be based exclusively on secondary, English-language 
sources, which immediately invites itself to critique and derision from the academic community. 
Although I do not dispute the value of primary sources, the inferior status assigned secondary 
materials and the automatic rejection of research based upon such sources seems to me a 
convenient scapegoat that somehow justifies the refusal to intelligently engage oneself in a topic. 
Secondary source literature can be of extreme value and should not be dismissed solely on the 
basis of some literary source hierarchy. The industrial revolution has produced a vast library of 
research, much of it based upon primary sources. New archival research, besides being beyond 
the fiscal and temporal parameters of this project, would be very unlikely to add anything new or 
productive to the debate. The secondary source literature available pertaining to industrialization 
is vast and provides fertile ground for new and continuing research.  
The fiscal and temporal limitations to carrying out archival research bring me to a much 
more serious limitation: that of language. While I do not conceive the use of secondary materials 
to be a hindrance to legitimate research, the inability to effectively utilize Chinese or Japanese 
sources presents a much more serious limitation to the types of sources applied and to the scope 
of the research question. However, this is a problem which cannot be quickly or easily solved. 
Though the use of Japanese materials might have been feasible, it would have been tedious work 
likely fraught with inaccuracies and misunderstandings. Unfortunately, the Chinese language is 
entirely beyond my current language capabilities. Naturally this poses some constraint when 
dealing with Chinese or Japanese subject matter. However, this limitation is one which cannot 
currently be overcome and must be acknowledged simply as an inadequacy of the author and a 
potential restriction on the comprehensiveness of this study. It is important to note that it is only 
a potential restriction and not necessarily a realized limitation. Given the amount of English-
language material available, both in the form of translations of Chinese or Japanese originals, as 
well as literature written originally in English but based upon Chinese or Japanese sources, it is 
18 
 
easily possible to do meaningful research without directly engaging the non-English materials. 
While I do not wish to claim that the abundance of English literature negates the importance of 
using non-Western or non-English sources, it does at least allow the possibility of worthwhile 
and productive research within the acknowledgment that one can never fully escape one’s 
politics of location.   
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4.  HITTING THE MALTHUSIAN CEILING? 
Any analysis of Japan from a Californian perspective must address the question of Malthus and 
to what extent Japan was at or near a Malthusian ceiling. Questions of population and land as 
well as resource use figure prominently in Californian endeavors to disprove the mainstream 
argument that Britain was freer of Malthusian pressure than China, and thus more able to invest 
and develop; rather, the Californians assert that Britain was no freer and perhaps even more 
Malthusian than China, and thereby potentially at least as involutionary as China had she not had 
the good fortune to have colonies which made her far freer of her land base than other societies.35 
Pomeranz essentially argues that Britain was set apart not by some sort of inherent European 
uniqueness; rather, Britain could have easily followed a trajectory similar to China’s had she not 
managed to escape Malthus through the acquisition of colonies and through the strategic location 
of her coal reserves. As such, according to Pomeranz, the question is not only why the Yangtze 
delta did not follow the European route but also, more compellingly, if industrialization was so 
unlikely, why Britain did not wind up like the Yangtze delta. If we accept, for the time being, 
Pomeranz’s well-crafted and influential line of reasoning as valid, what, then, of Japan? 
 Japan receives relatively scant attention from the Californians. Though given occasional 
mention, especially in conjunction with conditions in China, Japan is largely left out of Kenneth 
Pomeranz’s analysis in The Great Divergence, arguably the most influential work published 
within the California tradition. Similarly, Andre Gunder Frank devotes precious little time to an 
understanding of pre-industrial and early modern developments in Japan in his ground-breaking 
work entitled ReOrient: Global Economy in an Asian Age. Aside from casual references, Frank 
devoted a mere three pages to his assessment of Japanese economic developments and Japan’s 
role in global trade. Roy Bin Wong, another prominent member of the California School, focuses 
exclusively on China and Britain in his well-written book China Transformed: Historical 
Change and the Limits of European Experience. The lack of attention to Japan in this work does 
not represent any particular failing of Bin Wong, since it is clear that his intent is to demonstrate, 
by way of examination of the Chinese and British political economies, the deficiencies in blindly 
applying western-based retrospective concepts to different historical and political processes. 
However, it does make plain the gap of scholarship and literature pertaining to Japan within this 
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particular tradition of economic history. Kaoru Sugihara is one writer outside the California 
School who has made substantial strides in re-defining our understanding of East Asian 
economic development. Sugihara has helped draw attention to the existence and importance of 
Japan’s interactions with China and the intra-Asian competition that ensued; much of the 
analysis centers on remittances and capital flows, as well as overall trade and migration.36 This 
research has been invaluable in furthering the discourse on Japanese industrialization as well as a 
general understanding of intra-Asian dynamism. Stephen K. Sanderson points to the fact that 
Japan was the one society outside of Europe to develop a genuine feudal system.37 The accuracy 
of this may be disputed but Japan had in any case by the seventeenth century become 
undoubtedly a more-or-less secluded archipelagic state with growing population pressures. 
Indeed, Japan appears to have been as least as, if not more, Malthusian than either England or 
China and yet was the only country outside of Europe to industrialize before the First World War. 
How can we reconcile this with the Californian conclusion that Britain was able to industrialize 
primarily due to ghost acreage won through use of coal and colonies? First, it is instructive to 
look at how Malthusian Japan actually was, which leads us naturally into an investigation of the 
Japanese population in the decades leading up to the advent of modern economic growth.  
 Accurate population numbers are always difficult to attain and remain, today as in the 
past, mere estimates based upon the available data. In the case of Japan, territorial lords began to 
make great efforts at the end of the sixteenth century to determine the population figures for their 
respective regions.38Although these are useful for constructing national figures, they are not 
entirely unproblematic. Early surveys did not distinguish between households and individuals. 
Furthermore, these population registers focused initially on young, able-bodied men with the 
purpose of locating labor to requisition, which the subjects of the census naturally sought to 
evade.39 Therefore, through the conflicting interests of the lords’ attempts to locate potential 
labor and the subjects’ attempts to evade the same, the numbers from these population registers 
are not entirely reliable. Additionally, it seems highly likely that women were undercounted in 
these early population registers.  
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 However, despite inherent and unavoidable inaccuracies in population registers, it is still 
possible to make reasonable population projections for Tokugawa Japan. Various economists and 
historians have used population registers and estimated rice yields to generate plausible 
population numbers for Japan in the early modern period. The most widely accepted estimate of 
18 million people in the early seventeenth century was promulgated by Togo Yoshida and 
derived from the Tempo period national rice yield of 30 million koku projected back in time.40 
Conrad Totman puts the population at around 12 million people for this same period of time41 
while Akira Hayami and Hiroshi Kito come to an estimate of around 10 million people for this 
period through the use of crop yield ratios derived from the Taiko land survey of the late 
sixteenth century.42 The first national population survey conducted by the shogunate about one 
hundred years later in 1721 gives a population of about 26 million.43 Although the pre-1721 
estimates vary widely, it is evident from these estimates that the Japanese population increased 
by anywhere from 1.4 times to 2.6 times in a period of approximately 120 years. In contrast to 
this, the population of England grew in the same period from an estimated 4.1 million in 1601 to 
an estimated 5.3 million in 1721, or an increase of about 1.2 times.44 During this period, then, it 
would seem that the Japanese population was growing at a greater average rate than the English 
population; both an indication that resources were not yet exhausted but likewise an indication 
that Japan was approaching her capacity at greater speed. 
 When looking at comparative population figures and their Malthusian implications, it is 
important also to consider land area as well as arable land. It is difficult to distill any concrete 
conclusion from the fact that Japan’s population was five times larger than England’s population 
in 1721 without knowing also the availability of land. Japan has a total area of 377,915 square 
kilometers, including Hokkaido.45 However, Hokkaido was sparsely populated, with one person 
per square mile in 1750.46 Thus, if we exclude Hokkaido, the total area drops to about 282,402 
square kilometers, supporting a population of some 26 million in 1721, or a population density of 
                                                          
40
 Yoshida, Ishinshi hakko, p. 25. 
41
 Totman, Early Modern Japan, p. 250. 
42
 Hayami, Saitō, and Toby, The Economic History of Japan, 1600-1990, p. 217. 
43
 Totman, Early Modern Japan, 251. Totman cautions that these figures be read with care since they omit several 
thousand court nobles, some two million members of samurai households, and their servants and subordinates. 
Hayami and Kito also state that these shogunal calculations omitted approximately 5 million people. 
44
 Wrigley and Schofield, The Population History of England, 1541-1871, p. 528. 
45
 “CIA - The World Factbook -- Japan.” 
46
 Taeuber, The Population of Japan, p. 22. 
22 
 
about 92 people per square kilometer. 47  However, it shall be remembered that Japan is a 
mountainous country meaning that not all of this land would have been livable or cultivatable. 16 
percent of the total land area of Japan is today considered cultivatable, which would include 
Hokkaido.48 Keeping in mind the sparse settlement of Hokkaido, as well as the fact that it was 
settled by the Ainu and not officially a part of Japan at this time49, it becomes clear that Japan 
was supporting a fairly large population on a relatively small amount of land. By comparison, 
England in 1721 had a population of some 5.3 million living on a land area of 130,000 square 
kilometers, yielding a population density of about 40 people per square kilometer. For the sake 
of argument, we will assume that England has the same amount of arable land as Japan, though a 
cursory knowledge of geography will reveal that it certainly has more. In any case, it seems that 
Japan had more than twice the population density of England in 1721,50 and correspondingly 
greater Malthusian pressures. The Japanese population trend parallels to some extent the 
population trends also seen in China. Population estimates for China vary, but it is approximated 
that the figures rose from about 125 million in 1500 to 270 million in 1750 to 345 million in 
1800.51 Though I do not have reliable figures for the amount of arable land and population 
density, comparing the population figures for both China and Japan in the 18th century indicates 
that China’s population was about ten times larger than Japan’s; the arable land mass of China 
during the Qing Dynasty was almost certainly larger than this, from which we can infer that 
although China had an incredibly large population, it was in all probability not as dense as the 
population of Japan. Pomeranz considers this ability to sustain a large population at a relatively 
high standard of living in both countries an East Asian miracle—a path which also England 
might have found itself on, had it not been able to effectively escape its land constraints.52  
 Given the high population density of Japan in the early eighteenth century even with our 
generously low estimates, it will hardly come as a surprise that the population began to stagnate 
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in subsequent decades, showing signs of overpopulation and land exhaustion. According to 
census results the Japanese population remained stable in the 120 year period following 1721, 
rising only from 26,065,425 people in 1721 to 26,907,625 people in 1846.53 This represents 
essentially zero growth in a period of relative peace and political stability. Can we conclude, 
therefore, that Japan had reached by the early eighteenth century a Malthusian ceiling? 
Mainstream analyses have tended to come to this conclusion but in order to properly understand 
the validity of this assertion we will first need to examine the causes and consequences of this 
stagnation.  
 Conventional wisdom would indicate that century long population stagnation implies 
some land capacity having been reached, given the agricultural methods and technology 
available at the time. It was also around this time that peasant unrest and uprisings began to 
become more frequent, another indication that land and resources were likely scarce. As a result, 
an increasing number of laws and edicts regarding peasant behavior began to be issued by the 
Tokugawa shogunate, with the first law specifically concerning peasant uprisings being issued in 
1721.54 In the subsequent decades until 1839, at least ten more laws specifically regarding the 
problem of peasant uprisings were issued, with increasingly strict regulations and severe 
punishments.55 The causes of these uprisings were numerous, resulting not only from peasant 
discontent with shogunate policies and maladministration of fiefs as a result of the sankin kotai 
system of alternate attendance56 but also from increasingly heavy tax burdens and demands on 
the part of the shogunate and domainal officials for the extension of the area of cultivated land.57 
Although an immediate conclusion might be that these instances of peasant unrest had a direct 
correlation to decreasing resource availability, many of them were in fact to demand social 
reforms to eliminate extreme disparities in wealth.58 Indeed, through large-scale land reclamation 
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projects, the amount of land had more or less kept pace with the increasing population until 
approximately 1720, when both petered off.59 
 Therefore, on the one hand we have evidence of increasing uprisings and peasant unrest 
which might at first glance fall under the category of a Malthusian check reflecting the growth of 
population beyond the ecological limits60 while on the other hand we must contend with the 
figures which indicate that the growth of land kept pace with the growth in population before 
both stabilized in the 18th century. It is true that this could very well also indicate the maximum 
capacity of both population and land, but there is also evidence that this coincided with an 
increase in wages and the availability of wage labor.61 This will be analyzed in more detail in a 
later chapter but for our immediate purposes, it would appear that Japan was perhaps not as 
Malthusian as is often claimed.  
The relative standard of living in China and Europe comprises a significant portion of 
Kenneth Pomeranz’s thesis that prior to the nineteenth century the Chinese as well as the 
Europeans lived in a “world of surprising resemblances”.62 The main indicator normally cited for 
standard of living is life expectancy, which Pomeranz maintains was comparable in China and in 
Europe. Though his figures are a bit difficult to follow since his spatial and/or temporal units are 
often not clarified, Pomeranz bases himself on a study by Wrigley and Schofield to provide a life 
expectancy in English villages of mid- to high thirties through the eighteenth century, which 
climbed to forty in the nineteenth century and then remained fairly steady until after 1871.63 
However, he concedes that even these figures may be too high, since there may have been an 
underreporting of births and deaths in village communities. Pomeranz’s figures for China are less 
clear, but he gives a figure for a “relatively prosperous area” of 39.6 in the eighteenth century 
which declined to 34.9 in the nineteenth century.64 Which area this might be is not specified but, 
while even the lower figure might still be somewhat comparable to the English figures, the 
decrease in life expectancy indicates a negative trajectory at odds with the positive direction of 
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the English numbers. Despite this, Pomeranz does convincingly show that China was not the 
poor, involuted country it is often assumed to have been. 
Japan also is often characterized as a poor country with a low standard of living before 
industrialization. Hanley and Yamamura, both of whom have done extensive research on 
Japanese demographics, find a life expectancy of between 34.9 and 41.1 for males and 44.9 and 
55.0 for females in two villages in Japan in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.65 
The timing of this study is of particular value: these estimated life expectancies come during the 
period of “stasis”, in which the population stagnated and Malthusian pressures are said to have 
been realized. However, the life expectancies for the time do not indicate that Japan was less able 
to feed its large population than Britain or China. In addition to this, Hanley has shown in the 
well-researched Everyday Things in Japan: The Hidden Legacy of Material Culture that, by 
making optimal use of resources in the long run rather than maximum use in the short run, Japan 
was able to maintain a dense population on a relatively small allotment of land.66 Though per 
capita income may have been lower than in Europe other factors that influence the standard of 
living, such as hygiene and education, were comparably high in Japan.67Even Yasuba Yasukichi, 
who is skeptical of Hanley’s data and methods, concludes that the Japanese standard of living 
would not have been much below the English standard of living before industrialization, even if 
per capita income appears to have been somewhat lower.68 Overall, then, it seems Japan would 
have ranked favorably against both England and China in pre-industrial standards of living. 
Granted, this may not be a terribly revealing conclusion, since it is unlikely that there would have 
been extreme differences in wealth between any two pre-industrial countries; what it does serve 
to highlight however, is that the Japanese standard of living managed to keep pace with the 
growing population during the Tokugawa period, which signals that this epoch in Japanese 
history could not have been as static and backward as it is often characterized. 
 In order to more comprehensively understand the true extent to which Japan was headed 
for a collision with the proverbial Malthusian ceiling, it will be instructive to examine the other 
Malthusian checks which may have been present in late-Tokugawa Japan. Typically cited as war, 
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pestilence, and famine, we can immediately discount war as a major cause of death during the 
Tokugawa period, since, aside from occasional peasant protests, this was a period of relative 
peace and stability.69 Famine, on the other hand, is a positive check worth investigating in the 
Tokugawa period. There were recurring famines during the time under consideration, with the 
most significant being the Kyoho famine of the 1730s, the Temmei famine of the 1780s and the 
Tempo famine of the 1830s.70 Although these three are typically cited as the great famines of the 
Tokugawa period, by one count there were 154 crop failures in the early modern period.71 These 
famines and crop failures led to widespread peasant hardship and were also a contributing cause 
to peasant uprisings. Though there had long been crop-related peasant protests, “…there was a 
marked increase in the number of uprisings resulting from the famines of 1783-1787 from thirty-
five during the decade 1773-1782 to one hundred and one during the decade 1783-1792”.72 
 The Kyoho famine of 1732-33 was the first of the major famines and, in conjunction with 
previously poor harvests and intensified rice-tax collection, led to a reported 12,072 deaths from 
starvation and the loss of 75 percent of their crop in forty-six southwestern han.73 The great 
Temmei famine which followed in 1783 is still considered Japan’s worst famine to date and 
resulted in a loss of about 920,000 lives over a period of six years, with an additional 200,000 
deaths between 1786 and 1792, amounting to a loss of 1,100,000 lives.74 These numbers must be 
treated with some caution however, as the effects were not uniformly distributed nor can they be 
considered fully accurate. However, it is clear that Japan suffered from regular famines during 
this time, culminating in the Tempo famine of the 1830’s which again, though aggregate 
numbers are not available, wrought widespread destruction with reports that 35,600 people died 
in Hirosaki han alone between 1833 and 1839.75 While this number represents only one han, and 
presumably one unusually hard-hit by the famine, it does indicate to some extent the scope of the 
famine. Additionally, Susan Hanley and Kozo Yamamura have shown that the Tempo famine 
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was likely slightly more widespread than the preceding Temmei famine.76 In any case, it seems 
clear that there were repeated bouts of crop failure which produced at least some positive check 
on the population. 
 Although the reports of famine and crop failure are fairly well documented, the question 
that remains to be answered is how Malthusian these events really were. The main causes of the 
great famines were mainly exogenous, resulting from poor weather and natural calamities 
including volcanic eruptions, drought, floods, and frost.77 The Temmei famine, for example, was 
caused by the eruption and aftermath of Mount Asama during the summer of 1783.78 Thus, 
although the large Japanese population size was a contributing factor to the hardship of these 
years, even a sparsely populated area would have been affected by such exogenous disruptions to 
agricultural production; in fact, one third of the total losses recorded for the Temmei famine 
came from the thinly populated Tohoku region. 79  Admittedly, human behavior through 
deforestation and water management can have an effect on environmental conditions such that 
droughts and floods are not necessarily exogenous shocks as typically assumed by economists. 
Although volcanic eruptions fall outside of this, there is significant evidence of the consequences 
of human behavior on the environment even in the pre-industrial era. Increasingly during the 18th 
century areas of land became vulnerable to drought and flooding as a result of denuded hillsides 
and soil erosion; however, despite Malthusian appearances and the resulting potential for famine, 
Conrad Totman argues that this did not mean that the bio-systems had been devastated. Rather, 
in the mountainous and high regions of the land, which make up a good deal of the Japanese 
archipelago, wild realms still flourished. 80  While this may well have been the case, the 
mountainous areas most likely also account for regions of sparse population and poor soil 
conditions, therefore making these regions much less suitable for farming and human settlement. 
In any case, it seems reasonable to say that the great famines of the Tokugawa period certainly 
acted as some sort of positive check on the population which resulted partially from human 
behavior, but the number of deaths does not necessarily provide a convincing explanation of 
population stability and land exhaustion.   
                                                          
76
 Hanley and Yamamura, Economic and Demographic Change in Preindustrial Japan, 1600-1868, p. 63. 
77
 Borton, Peasant Uprisings in Japan of the Tokugawa Period, p. 23. 
78
 Totman, Early Modern Japan, p. 238. 
79
 Ibid., p. 240. 
80
 Totman, Pre-Industrial Korea and Japan in Environmental Perspective, p. 154. 
28 
 
 The third factor often cited as a positive Malthusian check is pestilence and disease. Due 
to fortuitous geographical location coupled with the relatively restricted international contacts 
and trade permitted by the Tokugawa shogunate, Japan was spared many of the most destructive 
epidemic diseases such as bubonic plague, diphtheria, malaria and typhoid fevers.81 Though it 
avoided some of the most notorious European killers, the realm did suffer bouts of dysentery, 
measles, smallpox, and influenza at increasing recurrence after 1700.82 The increasing occurrence 
of these diseases presumably reflects the growing population density and mobility, which would 
have aided the ease and speed of transmission of contagions. However, though undoubtedly 
devastating to individuals and families, most of the epidemic diseases with the exception of 
smallpox seem to have had little impact on population figures.83 Additionally, it is important to 
remember that Japan was becoming ever more urbanized at this time; urbanization could have 
catalyzed the spread of disease without necessarily indicating an asymptotic function of 
population growth towards its Malthusian limit. Therefore, pestilence may count as a positive 
check but offers also only a partial explanation.  
 Research by Hanley and Yamamura has shown that although the Tempo famine was 
surely a contributing factor in the population decline of the 1830s and 1840s, this does not 
explain why the population also failed to grow between 1804 and 1822, or 1822 and 1828 during 
which time there appear to have been no major famines or natural disasters, yet, according to 
their research, there does appear to have been an increase in the standard of living.84 Through 
extensive analysis of family structures as well as marriage and fecundity patterns, Hanley, in an 
independent study, determines that the ideal family pattern in the Tokugawa period was the stem 
family which was restricted in size through limited and late marriages but effectively maintained 
in case of no male heir through adoption; additionally, Hanley finds that both abortion and 
infanticide were common and widespread practice.85 Modern moral and ethical questions aside, 
Hanley points to this as an indication of conscious attempts to limit family size to just those 
members needed to continue the family line and no more. The question then arises whether this 
was a voluntary effort to improve quality of life in the densely populated Japanese archipelago or 
                                                          
81
 Jannetta, Epidemics and Mortality in Early Modern Japan, pp. 48-49. 
82
 Ibid. 
83
 Totman, Early Modern Japan, p. 252. 
84
 Hanley and Yamamura, Economic and Demographic Change in Preindustrial Japan, 1600-1868, p. 182. 
85
 See Susan B. Hanley, Everyday Things in Premodern Japan, chapter 6. 
29 
 
a forced result of resource scarcity and Malthusian pressures. In light of the evidence introduced 
by Hanley which show that existing data indicate that the Japanese standard of living and level of 
physical well-being likely did not lag much, if at all, behind Western standards in the nineteenth 
century, it is difficult to conclude that Japan was significantly worse off and more constrained by 
land availability than Western Europe.86 Of course, this is the argument also made for China by 
the California School; if Britain was able to escape her land base and Malthusian constraints 
through colonies and coal whereas China was not, how did Japan escape? To some extent, Japan 
may have avoided the “involution” of China through family planning that apparently bore a 
striking resemblance to family patterns found in pre-modern Western Europe but diverges 
significantly from family patterns found in China. 87  Hanley bases her claim of Japanese-
European similarity and Japanese-Chinese divergence on factors including age at marriage, 
ubiquity of marriage and stem versus nuclear family structure. However, writers such as Roy Bin 
Wong argue that Chinese marital fertility was much lower than people generally assume due to 
late onset and early cessation of child-bearing, and that infanticide was also widely practiced.88 
In short, depending on the scholar and the criteria used, one can find both similarities and 
differences in all three of these cases thus proving the question of similarity in family structures 
and fertility to be largely inconclusive. In accordance with this, the only real conclusion we can 
draw is that both China and Japan were densely populated, though likely not as Malthusian as is 
generally claimed. Both appear to have taken some measures to limit population growth, and 
both seem to have successfully supported large populations at standards of living at least as high 
as those found in Western Europe. 
Apart from demographic considerations, land use and farming techniques also figure 
prominently into the Californian development analysis of Britain and China. Extreme euro-
centrists such as David Landes claim that agricultural improvement including new techniques in 
watering, fertilizing and crop rotation were instrumental to Britain’s industrialization.89 As will 
become evident in the next chapters, however, such new techniques were not exclusive to 
Western Europe. Landes does not spare China much room in his analysis and although he does 
characterize the Japanese as learners, the implicit suggestion is that Western Europe and notably 
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Britain had and made the most of these advantages while others did not. Japan for him represents 
an anomaly in which a collective national effort rather than the individualism of European 
industrialization showed the potential success of different strategies under different 
circumstances.90 Eric Jones follows essentially the same line of argumentation by asserting that 
Europeans were uniquely wealthy in terms of capital and livestock, which could be accumulated 
by restricting population growth to slightly below its maximum.91 In response, Pomeranz and 
other Californians are quick to point out that although Europe may have had certain advantages 
in terms of technology, her disadvantages were “…concentrated in areas of agriculture, land 
management, and the inefficient use of certain land-intensive products (especially fuel wood)”.92 
Pomeranz goes on to argue that by European standards a very small number of animals sufficed 
to keep essentially all arable land under cultivation in areas of China 93  and that even with 
technological advantages in certain sectors, Europe would not have achieved self-sustaining 
growth without factors that allowed it to become far freer of its land base than other societies.94 
The essence of the Californian argument, then, is that China used land more efficiently and could 
adequately sustain a larger population than Europe but did not industrialize due to an inability to 
sufficiently escape the constraints of the land base. Keeping with this line of reasoning in terms 
of agriculture, labor and capital intensity, and land management, what sort of developments 
might we expect to find in the Japanese case? 
Similar to China, particularly South China, the Japanese economy was centered on a rice-
based agricultural system. This rice was grown in order to pay taxes in kind and therefore made 
up a large and important sector of agricultural activity; for the rest, soybeans, coarse grains, 
wheat and barley were grown for household consumption. 95  Indeed, as in all pre-modern 
societies, farm work formed the foundation of Japanese rural life and approximately eighty 
percent of the population consisted of peasants up until the Meiji Restoration96. Though the rural 
and village structure evolved throughout the Tokugawa era, of interest here is how the land and 
labor was utilized and on what sort of trajectory the economy seemed to be on, particularly in the 
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second half of the Tokugawa period. While it is inherently extremely difficult to definitively 
determine trajectory (which in and of itself implies a dubious claim of general linearity) from 
scattered reports and statistics, determining the extent to which the land was being exhausted or 
efficiently used can provide some insight into prevailing Malthusian conditions as well as 
solutions and likelihood of escape into modern economic growth within the Californian 
framework.  
Writers such as Eric Jones characterize China as a densely populated area in which 
resources were scarce to the point that land “…was not spared for growing much cotton at the 
expense of food crops”97 and in which internal colonization dead-ended in static expansion, 
structural stagnation and soil erosion.98 In short, China was beset by Malthusian pressures which 
resulted in stagnation and involution; or, to quote David Landes, China represented a society that 
had “taken the wrong turning”.99 Jones also points to the higher use of draft animals, timber and 
charcoal iron as well as use of water power for energy as particular European advantages that 
resulted in a higher standard of living than elsewhere in the world, and ultimately a different 
developmental path.100 In response to this, Pomeranz argues that while Asian societies may have 
reached densities that restricted the availability of livestock, this does not mean that agricultural 
production was inhibited; indeed, rice-farming did not require the large use of draft animals and 
Chinese techniques were in fact largely more productive than European techniques, allowing for 
a comparable standard of living.101 Roy Bin Wong for the most part echoes these sentiments, 
pointing out also that in China, as in Europe, nonagricultural sources of income became 
increasingly available to rural households102 while conceding that the fractal quality of Chinese 
society intended to, and succeeded in, replicating and maintaining order. 103  In essence, the 
argument can be made that while the Chinese people likely did not have a standard of living 
significantly below Western Europeans, they were on a different energy path, as well as a 
different ideological path which sought to maintain and sustain rather than to compete and 
change.  
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In light of these assessments, where can we locate Japan within this argument? As 
previously mentioned, at first glance, pre-modern Japan shared basic agricultural and economic 
similarities with China. Following a period of intense land reclamation and socio-economic 
growth at the beginning of the seventeenth century in the wake of unification, by 1700 little more 
land was available for reclamation and there was heightened competition as well as increased 
disputes over water rights, rents, taxation, and other perceived inequities.104 This would seem to 
indicate a society as close, or even closer, to its environmental limits than China. Evidence of 
this can also be seen in laws that were enacted as early as 1666 to curb excessive reclamation and 
protect the land—essentially a reversal from previous agrarian policies that emphasized land 
reclamation at all costs.105 This indicates on the one hand concern for the environment and 
apprehension regarding overexploitation of the land as a result of noticeable soil deterioration 
and flooding and established on the other hand a new policy of increased efficiency that would 
increase the output of existing farmland.106 
Around the beginning of the eighteenth century, Japan began to enter a period of both 
demographic as well as economic stasis. Leading up to this point there had been great 
improvements in agricultural techniques, including increased output through the expansion of 
both dry-field and paddy cropping as well as the use of fertilizers which allowed farmers to 
double and triple crop fields.107 In addition to these improvements, there were also large strides 
made in water management, which was a vital development for effective and efficient use of 
reclaimed land. The construction of levees, dams and canals were not only essential in 
preventing rivers from flooding but also enabled peasants living toward the middle and lower 
reaches of large rivers to engage in farming and it helped draw water from swamplands to 
previously unproductive land and foothills.108 This had a colossal impact both on the amount of 
available arable land as well as on the agricultural efficiency of said land. This was undeniably a 
period of rapid land expansion, with the amount of arable land increasing from an estimated 
2,064,657 cho109  in 1600 to 2,970,780 cho in 1730, and to a further 3,234,000 cho by the 
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beginning of the Meiji Period. 110  While this is an impressive growth, it coincided with a 
population growth at an annual average of .61-.96 percent until around 1720, which is 
surprisingly high for a pre-modern society. 111  After this, as already mentioned, both the 
population growth rate as well as the increase in arable land began to decline.  
The decline and eventual stabilization in population and arable land growth would imply 
that Japan had reached a Malthusian limit by the beginning of the eighteenth century. Indeed, the 
limits on land were becoming apparent. However, Japan managed to support its large population 
through various innovations, including fertilizing techniques and farm tool technology. One of 
the early fertilizing techniques involved the use of fishmeal and sardines, which supplemented 
mulch and earlier materials.112 The use of fishmeal as fertilizer was important for several reasons: 
it was not directly related to the geographical land boundaries of the country, and therefore 
represents to a small degree an escape from traditional land-bound fertilizers. It also spurred the 
fishing industry and promoted investment in larger fishing fleets and nets.113 Though sardines 
were also caught for regular consumption, farms consumed sardines in much larger numbers than 
did urban consumers, which led to the establishment of sardine guilds which also cooperated in 
helping increase the size of sardine hauls.114 Although this does provide one example in which 
Japan was able to go beyond its land base to improve agricultural output, the use of fishmeal 
would have been fairly marginal compared to other fertilizers, not to mention that it did not 
actually present an escape since fish stocks would eventually be depleted and did nothing to 
change the prevailing mode of production.   
Developments in farm tool technology included the innovation of more effective hoes 
and sickles, such as the invention of the Bitchu hoe, which permitted deeper tilling and was 
instrumental in the initial stages of soil preparation.115 In conjunction with new farming tools, 
there was an expansion in iron mining which drew on Chinese smelting techniques to provide the 
quantity and quality of the metal needed in order to make new tools.116 Although these tools may 
seem quite simple, the processes involved in mining the necessary metals and the extent to which 
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they augmented farming capacity were anything but. Another important innovation was the so-
called semba-koki, considered the only important mechanical innovation in farming during the 
Tokugawa period. 117  This new thresher consisted of a wooden frame with protruding teeth 
through which rice or wheat stalks were drawn to strip away the grain, improving significantly 
upon prior methods which consisted of two bamboo sticks across which the stalks were drawn.118 
The new method was certainly more efficient and illustrates the implementation of one type of 
labor-saving technology. However, even such seemingly labor-saving inventions through 
increased efficiency often mask the end result of such an efficiency increase: though the samba 
koki saved labor at the harvest, it also made possible for the first time to plant a winter crop 
immediately following the fall harvest.119 Therefore, rather than really saving labor, it merely 
evened out the distribution of labor throughout the year.  
Another interesting aspect of land management is the distribution and size of plots. Much 
is made by writers such as North of the tendency in Britain towards larger farming plots and the 
capitalization of economies of scale. 120  In what way does this compare to developments in 
Japanese agricultural distribution? The verdict in this case is a bit unclear. According to Kozo 
Yamamoto in his comparison of pre-industrial landholding patterns in England and Japan, there 
was a trend in both nations toward concentration in landownership such that wealthy farmers in 
Tokugawa Japan became large landowners much in the same way the nobles and gentry did in 
England.121 However, if we are to believe other writers such as Thomas C. Smith and Matao 
Miyamoto, there was an overall trend toward smaller units of farming resulting partially from an 
increased population under which farming families divided their inheritance which led to a 
shrinking in the scale of agricultural operations over time.122 Though it is difficult to say with 
certainty which view is correct, the argument for smaller farms over time is logical in light of the 
fact that farming methods were and continued to be heavily labor-intensive; had there been an 
increase in the size of agricultural plots as suggested by Yamamoto, one might also expect to 
find more use of mechanized tools or draft animals. However, this does not appear to have been 
the case.  
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In the agricultural aspects discussed in this chapter, conditions in Japan can be fairly 
closely compared to conditions in China. Both were rice-based agricultural economies with high 
population densities and general trends toward more labor-intensive farming practices. In fact, 
Conrad Totman asserts that by 1870, Japanese agriculture had become one of the world’s most 
intensive in terms of both labor inputs and yield per arable hectare.123 This indicates both the 
efficiency with which the Japanese were able to work their lands, but also an overwhelming 
reliance on labor inputs. Much of the efficiency can be attributed to improvements in farming 
tools and fertilizing techniques; while these certainly constituted technological advances, they 
resulted in the final instance in mere Smithian growth. Whereas the use of fishmeal as fertilizer 
did to some degree allow for an “extending [of] the realm”124, and did perhaps even foreshadow a 
future escape from the land base, fish ultimately were also a limited resource. None of these 
innovations changed the mode of production; they merely augmented and improved the existing 
mode. As a result, in terms of population and agricultural structure, we cannot say that pre-
modern Japan was much more likely to industrialize than China; and yet it did. As such, the 
Californian criteria of agriculture and land management do not yet suffice to explain the 
Japanese case. Next we will turn to questions of energy and resource use, including coal, timber, 
and the use of animals; perhaps there we will find conditions that explain the respective 
industrialization and non-industrialization of Japan and China.   
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4.1  RESOURCE USE 
The availability as well as use of resources can also be instructive in painting a picture of the 
Japanese path to industrialization. As Pomeranz notes, energy and resource use is one of the 
critical points on which he and writers such as Kaoru Sugihara differ; both consider the 
maintenance of a remarkably high standard of living given the extraordinary population size of 
China and Japan an Asian miracle of sorts, but their views depart on the question of the internal 
dynamics of this “miracle”. Sugihara suggests that a basic and crucial difference between the 
opposite ends of Eurasia is that already before the eighteenth century, Western Europe was on a 
capital-intensive path and East Asia was on a labor-intensive path.125 Pomeranz, on the other 
hand, argues that as late as 1750 China and Europe were surprisingly similar and, had it not been 
for coal and colonies, England may very well have ended up on the same labor-intensive path as 
China, thereby inhibiting the possibilities of modern economic growth.126 As we’ve already seen, 
Japan closely resembled China in agricultural practice and farming technique; how, though, does 
it stack up in terms of energy and resource use? 
 The existence and accessibility of raw materials, most notably coal, play an integral part 
in Kenneth Pomeranz’s explanation of the Great Divergence. He paints a complicated and 
somewhat contradictory picture of Chinese coal mining, which appears to have been at its height 
in the 11th century, but declined thereafter as a result of Mongol invasions, civil wars, floods, and 
plague.127 Additionally, Pomeranz argues that these mines were largely in the northwest of China, 
a fairly backward region distant from the rich and fuel-hungry Lower Yangzi region; the high 
transport costs and detachment from technical developments would have inhibited the sort of 
advances later made in Great Britain, where coal deposits were located near excellent water 
transport and near Europe’s most commercially dynamic economy. 128  However, despite 
geographical disadvantages faced by China, Pomeranz asserts that the Chinese had long 
understood the basic scientific principle underlying the steam engine such that “Europe’s 
advantage rested as much on geographical accident as on overall levels of technical skill and 
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much more than on any (probably nonexistent) advantage in the market efficiency of the 
economy as a whole”.129 In essence, the argument then boils down to the location of coal mines 
and proximity to urbanized, fuel-hungry regions. Pomeranz drives home this point by claiming 
that although “…China may have had less chance than Europe to expand construction and fuel-
intensive industries, it probably did not face a much greater threat to its ability to reproduce its 
existing standard of living than a hypothetical Europe without the Americas would have faced: 
indeed, it may have been slightly better-off”.130 The question of colonies and their importance in 
spurring industrialization will be addressed in the next chapter; however, for current intents and 
purposes, I will limit my analysis to fuel availability and energy production. 
 Historical records show that Pomeranz is not wrong in claiming that China had 
knowledge of coal and iron mining long before these became important sources of energy and 
production in England, or anywhere in Europe for that matter. The production of both coal and 
iron appear to have been at their height in the Sung Period (960-1279 A.D.), with North China 
producing annually more than 114,000 tons of pig iron by 1078—double what England would 
produce 700 years later.131 It is relevant to note that this production was in North China, which 
seems to corroborate Pomeranz’s view that mining centers were simply too distant from the main 
urban centers of the Yangtze Delta to be profitable. During the Northern Sung Period (960-1127) 
however, the imperial capital was situated at K’ai-feng, which grew into an impressive urban 
center and, according to Robert Hartwell, was quite likely unsurpassed by any other metropolis 
in the world prior to the nineteenth century.132 Industry grew up initially to meet government 
needs and also as a result of large deposits of coal and iron which could be transported over 
waterways fairly easily to the capital.133 The Sung capital was able to grow to its formidable size 
largely because of the availability of fuel and heating supplies in the form of coal and timber 
from the surrounding areas. Coal mines discovered and opened in the second half of the eleventh 
century were only 132 miles from the capital city and connected entirely by waterways, which 
was a distance less than one third the distance required for the British shipping of coal from 
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Newcastle to London.134 It is evident that coal and knowledge of coal processing as well as 
mining techniques existed in China at quite an early stage, and that at least during the Northern 
Sung period facilitated the growth of major conurbations in the vicinity of deposits. In fact, the 
extraction and use of coal was one of the things that Marco Polo was amazed by when he 
traveled in China towards the end of the thirteenth century.135 The fact that coal was known and 
used at such an early stage of Chinese history makes even more pressing the question of why 
steam power was not already discovered at this time and why the industry had declined so 
dramatically by the time England began to industrialize. The reasons for decline seem to have 
been manifold, including those mentioned by Pomeranz, but also to the loss of the main market 
in K’ai-feng which apparently resulted from a dramatic shift in the course of the Yellow River 
after it burst its dikes in 1194 which severed the direct waterway connection between the mines 
and the metropolis. 136  The following Mongol invasions led to further devastation and 
depopulation in northern China, which resulted in economic and political reorientation away 
from mining such that “from at least the beginning of the twentieth century to the eve of the 
Second World War it would appear that not one ounce of metal was extracted from ores at these 
sites [in Central Shantung and Northern Kiangsu] which had yielded from 10,600 to almost 
23,000 tons of iron per annum at the beginning of the last quarter of the eleventh century”.137 
Although the question of why China did not develop steam technology during this time remains 
open and in need of further research—with Pomeranz’s explanation of ventilation problems 
proving inadequate in light of the fact that mines in China were shallow and much more plagued 
by drainage problems due to a high groundwater level in Northern Kiangsu than by anything 
else138---it is clear that the industry had massively declined by the time steam power could have 
been introduced from abroad that it may have inhibited the successful transfer of technology.  
 To what extent can we conclude that Japan was similar or different to China and/or 
Britain in terms of coal availability and consumption? The research and data on this topic is 
surprisingly scarce, so it is difficult to draw any definitive conclusions. Conrad Totman devotes a 
few pages to the topic of ground coal and expansion of the realm which gives some insight into 
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the situation, but quantitative data is scant.139 However, from the research that does exist, we can 
determine at least to some extent the inception and development of a coal-mining industry in 
early modern Japan. Clearly one of the fundamental prerequisites for the construction of a coal 
mine is the presence of coal; this draws a direct parallel to the Pomeranz argument of 
geographical location being a primary determinant of effective coal use and coal-based 
innovation. Indeed, Japan does have large coal deposits but these are largely located at the 
peripheral regions of the realm. Most of these deposits can be found at the southern reaches of 
Honshu and northern parts of Kyushu, around the prefectures of Nagasaki, Yamaguchi, and 
Fukuoka; to be sure, endogenous coal mining, which germinated in the late seventeenth century, 
centered around these three prefectures.140 Significant amounts of coal can also be found in 
Hokkaido; however, prior to the very end of the Tokugawa period, Hokkaido was an 
underdeveloped region with a sparse population and no industry to speak of besides the fishing 
industry, which mitigated both the need for coal as well as the feasibility of extracting coal in the 
area.141 
 Due to far more favorable geography and topography than the coal deposits in Hokkaido, 
the mines of Kyushu, particularly the Miike mine and the Takashima mine developed into large-
scale mining operations around which the endogenous mining industry flourished. 142  These 
mines, though perhaps not as peripheral as those in northern China, also were located a fair 
distance from the urban centers of Kyoto and Osaka, and even further from Edo, or modern day 
Tokyo. In light of these relative proximities, it is perhaps not surprising that Osaka developed 
into the industrial core of Japan after the Meiji Restoration. Though the size and scale of 
Japanese mining operations prior to industrialization were naturally modest, it is important to 
note that an endogenous mining industry did exist as a result not only of increased fuel demands 
and somewhat conveniently located coal deposits, but also through state support.  
 In the early years of coal extraction, the people working in the mines were mere peasants 
and their families who were free of farm work; it was not until the late 18th century that mining 
became an independent industry through the establishment of professional coal miners and 
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managers.143 This meant that in the beginning surplus agricultural labor could be utilized in coal 
mining, thereby increasing the efficiency of peasants and augmenting their output. As the 
industry developed, increasingly sophisticated techniques also came into use. As was also the 
case in British coalmines, Japanese mines tended to fill with water which necessitated the 
development of certain drainage techniques. 144  In addition to questions of geography and 
transport costs, Pomeranz also makes the point that Chinese mines tended to have ventilation 
problems rather than drainage problems, leading him to conclude that “…Britain was fortunate to 
have the mining problem that it did—a need to pump out water, rather than prevent explosions—
since it led to engines with many other crucial applications”.145 However, it is in no way clear 
that drainage problems in coal mines would necessarily lead to the development of steam-
powered technology or to the mechanized conversion of potential energy into kinetic energy. 
Japanese mines also faced drainage problems, yet this did not lead to the invention of steam-
powered technology. Rather, hand pumps replaced suction-pumps, water wheels were introduced, 
and a pulley system was implemented that made it possible to work in pits as deep as 30 meters 
(as opposed to the conventional pits that were no more than 6 to 9 meters deep).146  These 
developments allowed mines such as the Miike mine in Kyushu to produce approximately 
30,000 tons annually.147 Evidently, the drainage problems faced by the Japanese led not to the 
invention of the steam engine, but rather to new, more effective techniques that sufficiently 
solved the most pressing problems without fundamentally changing the mode of production. 
 Although the largest and most significant changes in the coal-mining industry came with 
the opening of Japanese ports in the 1850s, even the introduction of steam-power and modern 
techniques merely augmented rather than supplanted the endogenous methods. Coal mining 
essentially became a compromise between old and new methods; however, the existence of an 
endogenous industry and skilled workers greatly eased the transition and allowed selected 
modern techniques to be implemented much faster than they otherwise might have been.148 The 
mines of Hokkaido provide an interesting study of contrast: these mines were only really 
developed after the Meiji Restoration in 1868, and had to do so in the absence of the 
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accumulated endogenous coal-mining technology found in the southern mines. 149  Although 
steam engines by this time had been introduced into Japan (in fact most of Hokkaido coal was 
extracted for the purpose of fueling foreign ships), the effective operation of these mines 
required the transfer of labor and skills from the Kyushu mines to the Hokkaido mines, as well as 
the importation of foreign labor and skills.150 Even so, due to an underdeveloped market and 
insufficient transportation infrastructure, this coal still cost 50 percent more than the average 
market price paid in Nagasaki, Kyushu.151  Ultimately, it took the intervention of the Meiji 
government and a comprehensive program of acquiring modern technology as well as sending 
Japanese engineers abroad to learn the latest techniques in order to make the mines viable—a 
process not required in Kyushu due to the existence of an endogenous industry and the 
corresponding infrastructure upon which modern methods could simply build.152 
 The establishment of an endogenous mining industry in Japan was largely the result of 
increased fuel demands and diminishing resources at the end of the seventeenth and beginning of 
the eighteenth century. As the population continued grew and then stagnated around 30 million, 
resources began to become relatively scarce, prompting the use of new materials for fuel and 
heat. This search for new fuel resources and expansion into the coal mining field led to some 
extent to an early escape from the landbase: 
The potentially most profound expansion of the realm was temporal rather than geographical: the 
beginnings of ground-coal use, which marked the start of Japan’s departure from total 
dependence on recently produced biosystem energy to partial dependence on the eons-old energy 
of fossil fuel. Much as in the British Isles, where people began using peat for fuel when wood no 
longer sufficed, mined ground coal when the peat became inadequate, and eventually developed 
steam-powered pumps to eject water from deep coal seams after shallow ones were exhausted, so 
in eighteenth-century Japan, where peat was unavailable, scarcity of fuel wood led to the burning 
of ground-coal. It was used mainly in the production of seasalt along the Inland Sea, but also for 
sugar processing and pottery firing. By the late eighteenth century the pollution produced by mine 
runoff and coal smoke was generating local opposition to coal mining and burning and eliciting 
periodic attempts to stop the practices. During the nineteenth century, however, regional fuel 
wood scarcities persisted and coal use slowly grew, foreshadowing the industrial age that lay in 
Japan’s near future.153 
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While the use of coal may have marked a departure for Japanese energy use, China also had 
resource scarcities that led to the development of coal mines; however, as previously mentioned, 
these declined after the Song era due to a series of catastrophes exacerbated by unsupportive 
government policies under later dynasties.154 From the tenth to the fourteenth century, China was 
undoubtedly advanced in areas of mathematics, medicine and metallurgy; coal, and even 
possibly coke, was used early on for the extraction of iron from iron ore under the impetus of 
supportive government policy.155 However, the catastrophes of later periods dovetailed with less 
favorable government policies and increasing concerns about effective resource use.156 In short, 
China surely experienced a scientific revolution of her own centuries before Europe and it is 
certainly true that much was lost due to famine, invasion, and other disasters—however, the 
sustained decline in coal use and innovation cannot be accounted for only by catastrophe and 
disaster. These may account for the initial decline, but cannot explain why industry and 
innovation had not recovered by the fifteenth or sixteenth century. Japan also faced opposition 
and complaints about pollution; however, the need for fuel and demand for energy ultimately 
eclipsed local complaints of contamination.  
 In a certain sense, Japanese coal mining and coal use can be said to have inhabited some 
sort of middle ground between Chinese mining conditions and those conditions present in Britain. 
Though the coal mines of Kyushu were not nearly as remote from urban centers as many of the 
Chinese coal deposits seem to have been, they also faced transportation problems. Prior to the 
construction of railways in the latter half of the nineteenth century, coal mines, even those which 
had been modernized, depended largely on conventional river transport which often led to an 
increase in the cost of coal due to high transportation costs.157 Distance of mines to the core and 
transportation costs is one of the main factors cited by Pomeranz in accounting for the lack of an 
industrial revolution in China; however, it is clear that merely having coal does not an industrial 
revolution make, and having transportation problems does not necessarily an industrial 
revolution break.  
 In terms of coal production and use, the endogenous industry was fairly insignificant 
compared with output in Japan after modernization or to the industry in Great Britain even 
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before the industrial revolution.158 However, the existence of endogenous techniques and skills 
provided a foundation for later industrialization. Though it seems unlikely that Japan would have 
developed the steam engine on its own, once the technology was introduced as a result of 
opening ports to foreigners, this technology could be adapted and utilized in a way not found in 
China. Although perhaps not as dynamic as in Western Europe, Japan seems to have been on a 
slowly increasing path of energy intensity in terms of coal use, as opposed to China which 
appears to have been on a regressive trajectory of efficient coal and energy use.  Another factor 
in determining energy use is the utilization of draught animals in agriculture. The question of 
capital-intensity and its significance is an important point of departure between Pomeranz and 
other scholars, with Pomeranz contesting the claim that the more capital intensive path of 
western Europe represented an ultimately crucial difference in development trajectory.159 One of 
the main considerations is the implementation of capital in the form of animals used in 
agriculture, and their productivity in relation to labor inputs.  
 Rice economies for the most part are labor intensive. This does not mean that capital was 
unimportant but merely that “…the nature of inputs required to raise output in wet-rice 
cultivation was such that capital played a subordinate role to labor in developing the forces of 
production”. 160  As already mentioned in our analysis of population demographics and 
agricultural systems, Pomeranz himself concedes that Europe had more livestock per person than 
Asian societies did.161 While this does not preclude that productivity was higher due to use of 
animals, it may certainly indicate an inherent difference in energy use. As a rice economy, 
Japan’s use of draught animals was similar to what was characteristic in China: indeed both were 
generally lacking animal husbandry. In Japan, it is estimated that fewer than 10% of all farm 
families engaged in animal husbandry and that only very few upper-class farmers used animals 
in their field work.162 Europe by contrast, had a far higher proportion of livestock to land, with 
England having a particularly high proportion especially in arable areas.163 
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 Whereas the agrarian structures of Western Europe tended to have higher capital inputs in 
the form of animals and livestock, the rice economies of East Asia relied much more heavily on 
labor inputs. Given the nature of rice farming, which remained the predominant crop in Japan as 
a result both of government encouragement and it’s higher caloric yield per acre than any other 
crop, the maximization of labor potential became the primary concern.164 This labor productivity 
was augmented by new farm implements and productivity-increasing instruments rather than 
through use of draught animals.165 Though in retrospect it may be clear that capital inputs rather 
than labor inputs constituted a different, ultimately more promising approach to agrarian 
management, there is absolutely no a priori justification for this. Both China and Japan supported 
exceedingly large populations at relatively high standards of living for long periods of time 
through careful land and labor management. Only in retrospect can it be said that use of animals 
and livestock may partially account for the different development and energy path of England in 
the nineteenth century. Indeed, it has even been argued that the lack of horses and horse-drawn 
carriages made life in Japanese towns healthier than in England, thereby having a favorable 
impact on the quality of life.166 In effect, given the high population and relative lack of land, 
Japan maximized output in such a way that best suited the circumstances of the time. 
 Overall, in terms of energy issues, though Japan and China are comparable in various 
ways, there also appear to be small dissimilarities which in the end may have made all the 
difference. Whereas Chinese coal production had been on the decline since the twelfth century, 
Japanese coal production made small but steady gains. The development of the endogenous coal 
industry relied mostly on new techniques and management; it was not until the ports were 
opened to outside influence that mechanization and modernization were brought to the Japanese 
mines. This indicates what while mining had government support and was actively pursued even 
prior to foreign intervention, attempts to deal with water drainage problems in Japan did not lead 
to the invention of the steam engine as it did in England. Therefore, the argument that Britain 
conceived of the steam engine due to access to coal coupled with the chronic need to relieve 
flooding in mines does not seem tenable; Japan faced a similar set of constraints, yet solved them 
in a different manner. However, the existence of and support for the endogenous coal industry in 
Japan may have been crucial—it was upon this foundation that the modernization of the industry 
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could build. In this sense, Japan was able to fuse endogenous skills with exogenous techniques in 
a way in which perhaps China was not.  
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5.  IMPORTANCE OF EMPIRE: COLONIES ESSENTIAL FOR ESCAPE? 
In addition to availability and use of coal, the main argument of Californians such as primarily 
Kenneth Pomeranz boils down to the crucial importance of escaping the land base through 
colonies and empire. Pomeranz explicitly argues that western Europe “…was able to escape the 
proto-industrial cul de sac and transfer handicraft workers into modern industries…because the 
exploitation of the New World made it unnecessary to mobilize the huge numbers of additional 
workers who would have been needed to use Europe’s own land in much more intensive and 
ecologically sustainable ways”.167 To illustrate his point, Pomeranz points to the importance of 
ghost acreage, slave labor, and a windfall of precious metals as having been decisive elements in 
British industrialization. In essence, all of these factors point to the importance of empire and 
exploitation of foreign land/labor; were colonies really so important though? 
 The concept of ghost acres comes originally from the food scientist Georg Borgstrom, 
who devotes an entire chapter to the concept in his 1965 book The Hungry Planet: the Modern 
World at the Edge of Famine.168 Ghost acreage essentially refers to the idea of nations managing 
to expand beyond the carrying capacity of their own lands through the use and exploitation of 
lands located elsewhere on the planet.169 Borgstrom’s conception of ghost acreage consisted of 
two further subdivisions: trade acreage and fish acreage.170 By each of these terms, he meant to 
express the additional farming that would have been necessary, in terms of land area, “…to 
provide from internal sources the net portion of a nation’s sustenance actually derived from 
sources outside its boundaries and in excess of its own carrying supply”.171 This concept, if not 
necessarily the terminology, was foreshadowed by writers such as Walter Prescott Webb in his 
last major work The Great Frontier; it has since been appropriated by writers including Andre 
Gunder Frank, Eric Jones and Kenneth Pomeranz to refer to the importance of Europe’s colonial 
possessions in spurring, or allowing at all, the industrial revolution.  
 The main tenet of this argument is that, in terms of raw material production, the amount 
of land and/or resources that Britain would have required in order to industrialize without the 
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benefit of far-flung land-abundant colonies would have far exceeded the carrying capacity of the 
British isles; indeed, Pomeranz argues that it likely would have put Britain on a similarly land- 
and labor-intensive path as China. The most significant and relevant resources typically cited in 
relation to ghost acres are sugar, cotton and timber. Both cotton and sugar were grown 
extensively in the British colonies in the Caribbean as well as in the North American colonies.172 
While cotton represents a somewhat special case which will be examined in detail later, sugar 
was of obvious caloric and nutritional value: according to calculations by Sidney Mintz, one 
hectare of millable sugarcane stalks under Caribbean conditions yielded 5.6 tons of high grade 
raw sugar—a quantity sufficient for 140 people, providing the equivalent of 420 kilocalories a 
day to each. 173  Since sugarcane required a tropical environment, Britain established sugar 
plantations on its Caribbean possessions, most notably on the islands of Barbados and 
Jamaica.174 Using these calculations from Mintz, Pomeranz then estimates that the “…calories 
from the sugar consumed in the United Kingdom circa 1800 would have required at least 
1,300,000 acres of average-yielding English farms and conceivably over 1,900,000; in 1831, 
1,900,000 to 2,600,000 acres would have been needed”.175 
 Timber was another important resource, especially during pre-industrial times. The 
extensive use of timber as a source of fuel was largely offset by the development of the coal 
industry; it is estimated that in the absence of coal, the timber requirements of England to 
provide the heat required to sustain its industry at the beginning of the nineteenth century would 
surely have denuded not only the forests of England but the forests of all Europe within a few 
centuries.176  This conclusion is based on calculations that the production of 10,000 tons of 
charcoal iron required the felling of 40,000 hectares of forest.177 These requirements would have 
been gargantuan and illustrate the extent to which Britain was able to move beyond traditional 
methods of providing heat and fuel. The use of coal certainly represents an integral element in 
escaping the land base and preserving timber for other uses; however, since this resource was 
mined at home and difficult to transport, it did not necessitate nor even encourage the exploration 
and colonization of new lands. Nonetheless, the American colonies were still relevant for timber 
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imports. Timber was used, of course, as firewood and charcoal but also as a building material. It 
was precisely an increasing scarcity in timber and fuel wood that led to an increased burning of 
ground coal.178 However, whereas coal internally expanded the British land base and therefore 
also allowed for a growing population, it was not a perfect substitute for timber; coal could not, 
for example, replace timber in the building industry (though it did allow for an expansion in the 
brick industry).179 In any case, timber exports from North America to Britain seem to have been 
negligible prior to 1800, but by 1825 had grown enough to replace the output of 1,000,000 acres 
of European forest.180 These acres represent the amount of “ghost acres” that Britain was able to 
save at home by obtaining resources from abroad.  
 
 It is important to point out, however, that the import of timber from the North American 
colonies (which no longer included the Thirteen US American Colonies after their declaration of 
independence in 1776 and official renunciation of any British claim in 1783181) was influenced 
heavily by British timber duties: in the 17th and 18th centuries, Britain had been heavily 
dependent on Baltic supplies of timber but by the first quarter of the 19th century, the British 
government had imposed duties of approximately 100 percent on all foreign timber while 
colonial timber was accepted at nominal rates.182 This indicates not only that Britain had colonies, 
but government policy dictated that colonies be used in a certain way; through protectionism and 
duties, the market was distorted to artificially raise the price of Baltic and Scandinavian timber, 
such that in every year from 1816 to 1846 Canadian timber accounted for at least 60%, and in 
most years for over 75%, of all unsawn timber imports into Britain.183 This, despite the far longer 
distance in shipping required to transport timber from Upper and Lower Canada than 
Scandinavia or the Baltic states.  
 
 Cotton also figures largely into analyses of the British Empire and is often heralded as the 
pivotal industry during the times of early industrialization.  E.J. Hobsbawm illustrates this by 
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showing that the pace of cotton largely measured the pace of the greater British economy and 
concludes that no other industry could compare in importance with cotton in the first phase of 
British industrialization.184 The production of cotton textiles originated in India and demand for 
cotton soon spread to Europe, to the detriment of local textile producers. The main textiles in 
Britain prior to cotton were woolens, which were coarser and less desirable than the cheap, 
comfortable cotton textiles coming from India.185 These cotton goods soon began to compete 
with the local textile industry, which led England in 1700 and 1720 to forbid the sale of Indian 
cottons on national soil; despite these protectionist measures however, the cotton kept coming.186 
The impossibility of keeping cotton out in turn stimulated a substitution market with the aim of 
producing fabrics of comparable quality at cheaper prices by imitating the Indian industry.187 
Cotton became the fastest growing major industry in the late eighteenth century, and was the first 
industrial activity to be organized in factories.188 
 
 Though the cotton industry rose up in England in part due to factory organization and 
improved techniques, the North American colonies also played an important role in the rapid 
expansion and growth of the industry. The eighteenth century was an era of extreme trade 
expansion, which can be seen in official figures showing that British exports increased from 6.47 
million pounds in 1700 to 40.81 million pounds in 1800, while imports similarly grew from 5.97 
to 28.36 million pounds over the same period of time.189 During this same time, imports of raw 
cotton also increased drastically, rising from 0.9 percent of total imports and exports in 1750 to 6 
percent in 1800; it was also during this time that the United States, despite its War of 
Independence, was starting to become Britain’s most important supplier of raw cotton needed to 
feed the growing textile mills.190 Over time, cotton grown in the United States became the main 
source of cotton used in the British mills such that by 1860, the United States supplied over 88 
percent to the cotton imported into Great Britain.191 This represented a vast amount of raw 
materials that Britain was able to import from abroad and thereby save land and labor at home 
                                                          
184
 Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire, p. 51. 
185
 Mathias, The First Industrial Nation, p. 128. 
186
 Braudel, The Perspective of the World, p. 572. 
187
 Ibid. 
188
 Wrigley, “The Supply of Raw Materials in the Industrial Revolution,” p. 12. 
189
 Mathias, The First Industrial Nation, p. 96. 
190
 Ibid., 97; p. 102. 
191
 Bailey, “The Other Side of Slavery,” p. 40. 
50 
 
which could then be put to other uses. According to calculations by Pomeranz, the only home-
grown textile that might have been able to replace cotton was wool; however raising enough 
sheep to replace New World cotton imports would have required 9,000,000 acres in 1815 and 
over 23,000,000 acres in 1830—more than Britain’s total crop and pasture land combined!192 As 
such, the expansion of the British textile industry depended heavily upon American ghost acres 
to supply the required amounts of raw cotton processed in the British mills.  
 
 Though cotton normally plays a prominent role in explanations of the Industrial 
Revolution, there are also scholars who believe the importance of cotton to be overstated. 
Among these is E.A. Wrigley, who disputes the idea that the cotton industry can be regarded as a 
microcosm of the entire process of industrialization on the grounds that the great changes in 
inland transport and in power were not closely connected to the cotton industry; rather, he argues, 
these critical developments were tied much more closely to coal extraction and the mining 
industry.193 Similarly, Braudel summarizes the arguments of other intellectuals, such as John 
Hicks and Ernest Labrousse, who argue that the total volume of cotton production paled in 
comparison with coal and the explosion of cotton production was accomplished without any 
major technical innovations.194  This line of reasoning does not necessarily seek entirely to 
discredit the importance of cotton in industrialization, but it does strive to place it within a larger 
context and to emphasize that advances in the cotton industry represented merely the culmination 
of a long process of changes found also in the older textile industries. However, Braudel then 
insists that the cotton revolution should not be underestimated, that cotton was already one of the 
major users of steam-power in the 1820s, and that even if the industry didn’t directly initiate the 
machine and transport revolution, it certainly did accumulate enough money to pay the initial 
costs of these nascent industries.195  In any case, the absolute importance of cotton aside, it 
undoubtedly figured prominently into how Britain integrated her New World colonies and 
trading partners into a modernized division of labor and production. 
 
 An integral aspect of the colonial mode of production was the use of involuntary slave 
labor. Though there is substantial and ongoing debate about the actual importance of slave labor 
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in driving British industrialization, it is undoubtedly true that purchasing a labor force from one 
part of the world to produce in another part of the world for the benefit of people in yet a third 
part of the world represented a new and novel division of labor. The question of profitability, 
however, remains. The definitive work on this topic is Capitalism and Slavery in which Eric 
Williams argues that the “…commercial capitalism of the eighteenth century developed the 
wealth of Europe by means of slavery and monopoly”.196 For Williams, slave labor was crucial 
for British industrial development, and he cites a figure of annual profit of over thirty percent.197 
This stance is modified slightly by Robin Blackburn who considers slavery important but not 
crucial: “Nor does our study lead to the conclusion that New World slavery produced capitalism. 
What it does show is that exchanges with the slave plantations helped British capitalism to make 
a breakthrough to industrialism and global hegemony ahead of its rivals”.198 These claims are 
supported also by J.E. Inikori, who shows that the slave trade was uncompetitive and 
monopolistic, yielding abnormally high profits for British investors.199 However, the suggestion 
that slavery was highly profitable to the British is not universally accepted and is contested by 
scholars including Roger Anstey who concludes that “…the most credible contribution of slave 
trade profits to capital formation is—at 0.11 percent—derisory enough for the myth of the vital 
importance of the slave trade in financing the Industrial Revolution to be demolished”.200 Robert 
Thomas agrees with Anstey’s assessment, going so far as to say that at least as far as the sugar 
colonies were concerned Adam Smith was correct in his claim that they resulted in more loss 
than profit.201 However, Barbara Solow uses a simple Cobb-Douglas function to show that, under 
the conditions of diminishing returns at home and constant returns in the colony as posited by 
Williams, the rate of return for investments in the British West Indies would have been far 
greater than the rate of return on the same investment at home; therefore, she draws the 
conclusion that “…the additional profits on capital generated by slave labor in the British West 
Indies were a source of a significant amount of saving, which found its way into investing in the 
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industrial sector of the home country”.202 An in-depth analysis of the extent of slave trading 
profits and critique of the various scholars who have researched the topic is outside the scope of 
this paper. However, it is clear that a substantial debate continues to surround the question of the 
economic benefits of the slave trade and its effects on British industrialization. In any case, while 
not taking a direct stance on the concrete profitability of the slave trade, Pomeranz does point to 
the slave trade as making Euro-American trade “…fundamentally different and more expandable 
than the more direct exchanges of raw materials for manufactured goods and silver between Old 
World cores and peripheries…[and] represented an indirect route through which Britain turned 
still more of its relatively abundant capital and labor into land-saving imports”.203 As such, 
though it is not his main focus, Pomeranz would certainly agree that the use of slave labor helped 
Britain to fully exploit and profit from its new-found ghost acreage in the new world.  
 
 Our excursion into the British colonies and their use of land and labor now brings us back 
to the question at hand: in what way does this compare with the Japanese route to 
industrialization? To what degree was Japan able to acquire ghost acres or expand her resource 
base? And to what extent, then, were colonies and ghost acres critical to early Japanese industrial 
development? While it is clear that Japan did not have a colonial empire anywhere near as vast 
as that of the British crown, one industry that warrants a closer look is cotton. As mentioned 
above, the cotton industry is often mentioned as the main impetus for early British 
industrialization, and even those scholars who are wont to downplay the significance of this 
industry will readily concede that its importance cannot be discounted altogether. Thus, 
particularly within the scope of Pomeranz’s assessment of coal and colonies having been vital to 
British industrialization, it will be instructive to examine the Japanese cotton industry and in 
what measure it dovetailed with the coal industry to initiate industrialization in the absence of 
many of the characteristics that defined the British use of  far-flung ghost acres. 
 
 The cotton industry of Japan was centered in the Kinai region of western Honshu, and 
constituted an important part of economic life for the people in and around the city of Osaka. 
Though it began on a small scale in the early seventeenth century, cotton growing in Japan 
would expand tremendously over the next few centuries, paralleling in many aspects the process 
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also taking place in Great Britain.204 Of course, merely growing cotton and building up a bona-
fide industry are two very different things. Nonetheless, cotton seems to have often been at the 
forefront of shifting modes of productivity and technology. The Japanese cotton industry actually 
has its roots in Korea where cotton was already being grown by the end of the fourteenth century 
and in such quantities that from the 1420s onward it was being exported to Japan.205 Though the 
crop was also grown in Japan starting in the sixteenth century, it was not until the seventeenth 
century that Japan became sufficient enough in growing and manufacturing to displace the 
Korean export market.206 
 
 The growth of the Japanese cotton industry both depended upon as well as encouraged 
the increasing trend toward wage labor and tenant farming. During the second half of the 
Tokugawa period, there was climbing demand for labor in the commercial and pre-modern 
manufacturing sectors of the economy which led to more and more peasants finding that they 
could increase their income be either leaving the land completely or partly in order to become 
full- or part-time merchants or else wage earners at the rising wage level.207 These commercial 
crops included tobacco, rapeseed, and most importantly, cotton. Beginning in the early 
eighteenth century, cotton processing increased among cultivators and cotton ginning as well as 
carding, spinning and weaving became important and wide-spread forms of by-employment for 
villages.208 Initially these activities were closely concentrated in the Kinai region around Osaka 
but they gradually spread. In a study of by-employment in 33 villages that today make up the 
modern cities of Amagasaki, Nishinomiya and Fuse reports as early as 1677 show women 
weaving cotton cloth and by the middle of the eighteenth century there are reports of women 
weaving cotton cloth in the off-season from all three of these regions.209  
 
 The weaving of cotton cloth was very often done by female workers in their spare time, 
offering an opportunity for off-seasonal and evening employment on a scale never previously 
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available to villagers as a whole, but to women in particular.210 With the rising profitability of 
commercial farming, what began as an off-season by-employment activity slowly became an 
increasingly strong incentive for marginal peasants to shift their focus from agriculture to 
becoming merchants or wage-earners in commerce and pre-modern manufacturing.211 This shift 
in the late Tokugawa period provided the foundation upon which a modern cotton industry 
would be formed in post-Meiji restoration Japan. The existence of pre-modern cotton production 
and an efficient, skilled labor force adumbrated future developments; indeed, factory production 
of textiles is often regarded as a decisive first step on the path to industrialization.212  
 
 In the early period of growth in cotton production, cotton processing was heavily 
dominated by specialized merchant organizations in towns like Osaka and Hirano who attempted 
to restrict trade to authorized merchants and regulate the distribution of cotton goods.213 Despite 
having been granted monopsonistic rights from the Edo government, these organizations were 
gradually undermined by rural cotton processers who resisted urban merchant control by taking 
independent action and successfully petitioning for the retraction of exclusive rights to urban 
merchant organizations in 1823.214 Following the diffusion of cotton processing, the industry 
began to grow rapidly, with the first cotton factories being established in 1881.215 Of course, it 
must be kept in mind that the period between 1823 and 1881 was not just any ordinary 60-year 
period in Japanese history; rather, it was a time of revolution, political turmoil, and the beginning 
of large-scale interaction with foreign powers. Although cotton production and processing was 
already firmly established in Japan well before the Meiji Restoration, the technology transfer that 
accompanied the opening of Japanese ports contributed to the development of factories and the 
beginnings of true industrialization.  
 
 Reports of cotton manufacture in the 1830s indicate that cotton grown in Kinai was 
shipped by local merchants to Osaka, where wholesalers then distributed the ginned cotton to 
provincial merchants everywhere who in turn sold it to peasants who worked the raw material 
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into yarn and cloth.216  The raw material thus passed through numerous hands before being 
processed and turned into cotton yarns or cloth. The opening of Japanese ports after the arrival of 
Commodore Perry in 1854 led to major changes, both politically as well as economically. 
Having been shocked out of feudal isolation, the Meiji politicians soon realized that the best 
method of resisting foreign encroachment was rapid industrialization and the adoption of modern 
armaments.217 There was significant technology transfer, which can be seen quite clearly in the 
evolution of cotton production; the first set of modern spinning machinery was sent to Japan in 
1866218  and the cotton-spinning industry of the Meiji era was the first in Japan to develop 
extensive factory production.219 However, this is not to say that factories did not exist in Japan 
prior to this time. Workplaces employing up to one hundred people could be found in several of 
the textile trades as well as in sake-brewing and wax manufacture already in the late Tokugawa 
period; these tended to be small and relatively unimportant in the greater picture of economic life 
but nonetheless, organized, centralized production was not unknown.220 
 
 The production of cotton in Japan, as in Britain, is considered a leading industry in the 
road towards industrialization. According to leading scholar Gary Saxonhouse, “…Japan’s 
cotton-spinning industry…stands alone as Japan’s first truly successful assimilation of modern 
manufacturing techniques developed elsewhere”.221 Saxonhouse attributes much of the growth 
and success of both the Japanese cotton industry as well as the greater Japanese economy 
generally to the skillful adaptation of foreign technologies and the proper application of these 
technological transfers. Much of the growth of the cotton industry also rested upon the backs of 
the labor force which was utilized in the increasingly large factories that began to spring up in 
the Meiji period. From 1891 until 1935 the work force was comprised largely of teenage girls 
from the most underdeveloped parts of Japan, usually the young daughters of impoverished 
farmers and fisherman.222 The application of a cheap and inexperienced labor force allowed 
Japan to compete with foreign powers, and by 1897 cotton-thread exports were more than twice 
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the amount of cotton thread imported.223 The cotton and textile industries were a leading industry 
in terms of technology transfer and ability to compete with western powers in the wake of the 
sudden, forced foreign interaction of the 1850s and 1860s.  
 
 It has become clear that Japan certainly had a highly specialized system of cotton 
production prior to the introduction of foreign technologies and practices. There is even some 
evidence of a nascent factory system, with reports of small factories existing both in textiles and 
sake-brewing already in the Tokugawa period. While it is hard to convincingly argue a counter-
factual, it is at least plausible that Japan might have developed a more wide-spread and efficient 
factory system of its own without the intervention of foreign powers. In any case, Japan certainly 
already had a stable foundation upon which industrialization could build. Regardless of whether 
Japan might have eventually developed her own factory system and industrialization (though it 
seems unlikely this would have happened without at least some increase in foreign trade and 
competition, whether forced or voluntary), what is relevant here is that Japan did have a cotton 
industry and was able to industrialize without the benefit of ghost acreage and an expansive 
empire from which to import raw materials. Indeed, though Japanese industrialization is often 
credited to the intervention of westerners, it is undoubtedly the case that Britain also 
industrialized through contact and competition with foreign powers; Britain industrialized on her 
own just as little as Japan did. And, even in her industrial phase and transition into modernity, 
Japan did not abruptly abandon the old and fully adopt the new but rather maintained many old 
political as well as economic practices.224 In fact, Japan remained largely agricultural during this 
period. According to E. Patricia Tsurumi, in the 1880s before the Japanese industrial revolution 
was fully launched, 78 to 80 percent of those gainfully employed worked in agricultural 
occupations; by 1902 this number was still as high as 67 percent.225 Though the transition to 
industrialization and modernity was surely accelerated with the arrival on foreign powers on 
Japanese shores in the mid-nineteenth century, it was not the abrupt and total change that it is 
often characterized as but rather the expedited culmination of processes which had their roots in 
pre-Meiji times.  
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 Although Japan produced cotton at home through a specialized and efficient labor force 
without the benefit of ghost acreage in the same sense as Britain, Japan did also have colonial 
aspirations. To what extent was the colonial expansion of Japan necessary or important to her 
development? The argument postulated by Pomeranz asserts that the British colonies and the 
expansion of the land-resource base they provided were a crucial element in preventing Britain 
from following the land-intensive involutionary route of China. The implication, then, is that the 
colonies were some sort of pre-condition for industrialization; or perhaps not colonies per say, 
but a successful expansion of the land-base which was most effectively done by acquisitioning 
scarcely-populated foreign lands and developing them to meet the needs of the home country. Of 
course, the fact that Britain had colonies in the first place cannot be considered an accident, nor 
can colonies alone be considered sufficient for industrialization (as exemplified by the Spanish 
and the Portuguese, who had some of the resource-richest colonies yet failed to capitalize on 
them in the way that Britain did). In any case, colonies figure heavily into Pomeranz’s 
explanation for British industrialization. In the context of Japan, then, it will be instructive to 
evaluate more closely the importance and necessity of Japanese imperialism in allowing for or 
sustaining Japanese industrialization.  
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6.  THE JAPANESE COLONIES 
Although the Meiji Restoration in 1868 is often used as a convenient starting point for modern 
Japan, it was not until the late 1880s and 1890s that the basic structure and ideology of Japan’s 
industrial order was in place.226 Originally, with the arrival of foreigners on Japanese shores, 
Japan had been a part of the informal empire that the West had established in East Asia through 
treaty ports and unequal agreements.227 It is a distinctive as well as noteworthy element of 
Japanese imperialism that she managed to escape the informal western empire of which she was 
originally a part and to establish her own colonies and imperial empire in Asia. 228 
 
 The expansion of Japan, in terms of extending her land-base, came at her own peripheries 
toward the northern and southern ends of the realm. Starting even before the fall of the 
Tokugawa regime, as Japanese leaders became familiar with western conceptions of sovereignty 
and jurisdiction, there was a push to claim political authority over the Ryukyu islands to the 
south (previously the Ryukyu Kingdom) and Hokkaido in the north. 229  The settlement of 
scarcely-populated Hokkaido and government programs to promote both settlement and land 
reclamation began almost immediately after the Meiji Restoration with the re-settlement of ex-
samurais and others to lands traditionally inhabited by the Ainu people; beset by poverty and 
disease, the Ainu population hovered around 18,000 while the Japanese population increased 
from 60,000 in 1850 to 1.8 million in 1913.230 The formal annexation of the Ryukyu island chain 
came a bit later, in 1879, but these islands, despite nominal independence, had long been under 
the effective governance of Satsuma231 and had also seen some earlier influxes of Japanese 
settlers.232 These early expansions were mostly labor migrations to peripheral areas that to some 
extent may have already been considered “Japanese”, or at least within the Japanese sphere of 
influence. This type of expansion may be equated with the growth of the Chinese realm, which 
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has been characterized as the movement of Chinese people into empty parts of China, and 
therefore fundamentally different from the type of colonization practiced by European powers.233 
It is argued that in moving into more peripheral regions in China, Chinese villages merely 
replicated themselves in smaller, fractal form 234  whereas British overseas colonies were 
integrated in an entirely different way into the home economy.  
  
 According to Conrad Totman, it was in the 1890s that “…Japan began to manifest an 
industrial society’s dependence on external sources of raw material—metals, raw cotton, and 
food initially, other goods later—and began to flush out its basic strategies for global resource 
acquisition and future development”.235 Totman goes on to say that Japan adopted the preferred 
method of the day for market access and essential resources: gunboat diplomacy and empire 
building.236 Was empire building really necessary though? We have already seen in the case of 
cotton that by 1897 Japan was exporting twice the amount it was importing; in this case it seems 
that Totman’s characterization of external demand for resources is inaccurate. To what measure, 
though, did Japan rely on its colonial acquisitions for other resources or as a ready market for 
manufactured goods? 
 
 Japanese imperial activities can be said to have really begun with her policy in Korea in 
the last decade of the nineteenth century and the subsequent declaration of war against China in 
August 1894, thus commencing the first Sino-Japanese war.237 Though Korea would not be 
officially annexed by Japan until 1910, this was merely the culmination of nearly two decades of 
Japanese policy and intervention in the Korean peninsula. The emergence of Japan from a 
relatively closed feudalistic society coincided closely with the consolidation of western powers 
into modern states characterized by centralization of state authority, mass incorporation into the 
economy and polity, and a broadened concept of defense to include not only domestic defense 
but also defense of strategic national interests abroad.238 Though such conceptions of a modern 
nation-state were relatively new also in the west, it has been argued that Japan awoke to a world-
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order in which it was somehow believed that all successful modern powers must expand 
overseas.239 While this aspect of Japanese imperialism will be explored in further detail later, the 
main question of concern is to what degree colonies and imperialism were essential to Japanese 
industrialization within the framework of the argument Pomeranz lays out for the importance of 
colonies in fueling British industrialization.  
 
 Although a detailed analysis of all the historical processes and alliances leading up to 
Japanese dominance in Asia is beyond the scope and scale of this study, a short, explanatory 
detour into the causes and consequences of Japanese policy in Korea may help to illustrate the 
role that colonies played within the larger picture of Japanese industrialization. In attempting to 
expand her sphere of influence Japan declared war against China in 1894 over the question of 
influence in Korea and under the conviction that assertiveness was essential to fending off 
western rivalries.240 Both China and Japan had some historical claims over Korea through their 
respective tributary systems, but Chinese claims and influence over Korea were officially 
removed with a surprising Japanese victory over China in the Sino-Japanese war. 241  The 
aftermath of this victory firmly established Japanese pre-eminence in Asia. In the treaty of 
Shimonoseki signed in 1895, Japan received Chinese acknowledgement of Korean independence, 
was ceded the territory of Formosa (Taiwan), and the Liaotung Peninsula, was paid a cash 
indemnity of 200 million taels (about 300 million yen), was granted the opening of four treaty 
ports, and lastly, was granted most-favored-nation status242; Japan was later forced to return the 
Liaotung Peninsula to China after the intervention of Russia, Germany and France but Japan had 
nonetheless won a major victory and transitioned from a country subjected to unequal treaties to 
one successfully enacting such treaties.  
 
 In the wake of China’s defeat against Japan, China’s military weakness had been fully 
exposed and this then began an era of concessions and alliances which eventually led Japan into 
direct conflict with Russia. War was declared in 1904 and the subsequent Japanese victory 
returned the Liaotung Peninsula to Japan as well as granting railroad rights in Manchuria and, 
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most importantly, forcing Russia to recognize Japan’s claims in Korea.243 With the defeat of both 
China and Russia in a decade’s time, Japan had positioned herself as not only the major power in 
Asia but also an important global player. It had succeeded in defeating a European power and 
had in the process managed to join the great imperialistic game that seemed to characterize the 
external behavior of modern states in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.244 
 
 What did these military victories and admission into the club of imperialists mean for 
Japanese industrialization and economic development though? While military victory surely 
bolstered national sentiment and conceptions of a national identity, the colonies that Japan 
acquired were wildly different from those established by the British in the Americas. Can these 
colonies be considered crucial, then, as an expansion of the land base or as suppliers of raw 
materials, in the way that Pomeranz argues that the British colonies were crucial in British 
industrialization? Or were the Japanese colonies crucial to industrialization in some other way? 
Or can we conclude that Japanese imperialism, though certainly significant to the historical 
development of Asia, was not a vital or necessary step in Japanese industrialization? 
 
 The Japanese colonies in East Asia were from the outset different from the colonies that 
were established by western European powers in the Americas. The Japanese colonies were 
much closer in geographical terms to Japan than was the case with Europe and the Americas, 
meaning that disease was much less of a factor for the indigenous population. In fact, climate and 
disease were more of a problem for the colonizers than the colonized in the early years of the 
Japanese presence in Taiwan.245 Additionally, Japan colonized neighboring states with whom 
they shared some racial and cultural traits which meant that they could more realistically imagine 
a full integration of colonies into a greater Japan; this proximity also had the result that Japan, as 
well as many Japanese, played a more direct role in colonial rule than was typically the case in 
the European colonies.246 However, in contrast to the British colonies in North America and the 
Caribbean, the Japanese colonies had established political and societal structures which had to be 
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transformed. In the British American colonies whatever indigenous structure existed was quickly 
wiped out through the arrival of Europeans and the diseases that accompanied them, which then 
also necessitated the procurement of a non-native work force. 247 The Japanese, on the other hand, 
began their imperial experiment in populated regions that already had an internal political and 
structural dynamic before becoming part of an expanding Japanese empire.  
 
 For the purposes of this paper, only the Japanese colonies of Taiwan and Korea will be 
considered. With the end of the Russo-Japanese war, Japan also regained the Liaotung Peninsula 
(called Kwantung by the Japanese) as well as South Manchurian Railroad rights in Manchuria.248 
Japan’s forays into Manchuria would prove to be significant in the history of Japanese imperial 
policy. However, Manchuria would not become truly important until after the First World War 
and therefore falls outside the parameters of this study; moreover, Japan’s primary interest in 
Manchuria was as a strategic and commercial asset which differed significantly from her interest 
in Taiwan and Korea as agricultural appendages of Japan.249 As such, the focus here will be 
exclusively on Japanese activities in Taiwan and Korea. This is not to discount the importance of 
Manchuria as a colonial asset but, as will later be made clear, by the time Manchuria became a 
focal point of imperial logic Japan was already well on her way to becoming a fully 
industrialized and modernized society. 
 
 Although the Sino-Japanese war was fought largely over claims to Korea, one of the 
spoils of the war as outlined in the Treaty of Shimonoseki was the island of Formosa (Taiwan), 
and it was there that Japan developed and defined her imperial policy. To be sure, Korea also 
moved definitively into the Japanese sphere of influence after the Sino-Japanese War, but was 
only officially annexed at the end of the first decade of the twentieth century. Rather, it was 
Taiwan which would become Japan’s most successful colony and the governing of which was 
considered “…a crucial experiment by which [Japan] would not only join the ranks of the 
Western imperial powers, but would surpass them through the development of a superior form of 
colonial relationship”.250 Taiwan was effectively Japan’s first colony and establishing authority 
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there was imperative for the success of the greater Japanese imperial experiment.251 
 
 By the time Taiwan came under Japanese control in 1895, the island had already 
experienced various episodes of colonial subjugation. Being a part of the Chinese tributary 
system meant that Taiwan had a long history of loose political connection with China but was 
only fully incorporated into the Qing Empire in the late seventeenth century.252 Prior to this, due 
to convenient geographical location along the Southeast Asian trade routes, Taiwan was of 
interest to the newly arrived Europeans and came under Dutch rule from 1624 until 1662.253 The 
population of the island was comprised primarily of the indigenous aboriginal peoples and 
Chinese immigrants who came to Taiwan in the eighteenth century when the Qing rulers of 
China lifted the previously imposed immigration ban and pursued instead a policy of pro-
colonization.254 However, having been under Qing control prior to being ceded to Japan, China’s 
main concerns for Taiwan were to keep it out of the hands of foreigners, to preclude anti-Qing 
sentiments from arising there, and to prevent the island from becoming too great an economic 
drain on the empire; even these minimum criteria were supposedly not met though, and despite 
garrisoning the island with approximately 10,000 troops to prevent uprisings, it has been argued 
by Asian politics and security expert Denny Roy that Qing China never exercised effective 
control over the island.255 It was in this state of on-going conflict and ineffective control that 
Taiwan was handed over to Japan in the last years of the nineteenth century.  
 
 A latecomer to the imperialist game with essentially no experience in overseas expansion 
and in possession of a fruit of war that by many accounts was still a semi-savage island, Japan’s 
venture into the business of colonialism did not initially appear to be off to a very promising 
start.256 Indeed, perhaps due to inexperience coupled with a non-monetized subsistence-based 
colony, early Japanese colonial policy in Taiwan was somewhat aimless and chaotic.257 To be 
sure, colonialism could be costly and troublesome and gaining Taiwan as a prize of war meant 
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that Japan, whose own modernization was still on very tentative ground, had to devise a policy 
regarding the administration of this new acquisition. After a bit of a haphazard start, a colonial 
policy was established in which it was clear that the colony represented an investment which was 
meant to be a source of profit for the mother country and was expected to provide the return of 
both principle and interest in as short a time as possible.258 
 
 Taiwan would prove to be quite rich in resources with an abundance of fish and timber as 
well as a climate suitable for cultivating rice, sugar, tea, vegetables and fruit; it is unlikely 
however that Japan would have known the true economic potential of the island before deciding 
to colonize it.259 In any case, Japan quickly began to view her colonies in the same light as 
European colonial powers did: as a source of goods and raw materials that were scarce at 
home.260 In this sense, the colonial aims of the Japanese and British empires appear to have been 
similar. As detailed earlier, in chapter 5, the British colonies were used for the production of 
sugar and cotton which alleviated the land restraint at home and provided the English population 
with assured access to these goods.  Considering the population pressure and scarcity of 
resources at home, as well as the benefit of European colonial examples, it should come as no 
surprise that the Japanese would soon come to see their colonies in agriculturally and 
economically profitable terms. 
 
 In Taiwan, sugar came to be the sector of greatest importance during the first period of 
Japanese control. Between 1896 and 1904 Japan annually spent more than 22 million yen to 
finance sugar imports, which accounted for more than 50% of her trade deficit in this period.261 
Although the Japanese per capita sugar consumption was only about one seventh of that found in 
Britain, the high import costs of the good were so serious that it was identified as one of the most 
important commodities for import substitution, which only became possible with the acquisition 
of a colony with a climate suitable for sugar cultivation.262 Taiwan had just such a climate and 
sugar production came to be an agricultural priority on the island. An important component in 
the successful promotion of the colony as an agricultural and profitable investment was an 
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extensive cadastral land survey which was carried out under considerable costs to the Japanese 
government but was pivotal in establishing a basis for agricultural taxation and providing 
information to select Japanese companies involved in exploiting the primary sector.263 It was 
well known that during the Qing times, land taxation was extremely inefficient and land 
registered for taxation was significantly less than the cultivated area; the cadastral survey 
identified this untaxed land with the result that the taxed area quadrupled and uncultivated land 
suitable for cultivation was disclosed.264   
 
 In addition to the exhaustive land survey, the administration ordered a study of the land 
conditions to determine future industrial prospects. This study was carried out by Nitobe Inazo 
who reported that sugar production could be expanded fourfold if new seeds were used, water 
and fertilizer inputs increased, and additional modern mills were built.265 These measures were 
implemented and the area of cultivation as well as the sugarcane output and the value of sugar 
exports increased dramatically. The area of cultivation increased from 16,029 hectares in 1902-
1903 to a high of 86,753 hectares in 1910-1911 before falling to 73,981 hectares in 1913-1914. 
This corresponded with an increase in sugarcane output from 270,940.4 tons to a high of 
1,870,070.2 tons before falling to 1,048,061 tons in 1913-1914 at respective export values of 
4,231,000 yen increasing to 35,263,000 yen and then falling to 15,479,000 yen. 266  Since 
sugarcane had to be processed in order to be consumable, this cultivated cane had to be brought 
to the Japanese-owned sugar mills and the sugar famer had to accept whatever price the mill 
would pay; the owners of these mills were thus able to make large profits through keeping the 
price of raw materials artificially cheap.267 The profitability and growth of the sugar industry was 
further enhanced by the protectionist policies adopted by the Japanese government which 
imposed high import duties on foreign sugar while allowing colonial sugar to go untaxed.268 In 
this sense, Japan utilized her colony as a supplier of a raw material not available at home much 
in the same way the British exploited their sugar colonies in the Caribbean. 
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  Japan’s second important colony prior to World War I was Korea. Unlike the case with 
Taiwan, which was ceded without much forethought immediately after the end of the Sino-
Japanese war in 1895, the annexation of Korea came about only in 1910 after a long process of 
increased Japanese influence on the peninsula.269 This meant that by the time Korea officially 
became a Japanese possession, an imperial strategy had already been developed and could be 
transplanted without the hesitation and aimlessness of early policy in Taiwan. It was also the 
case that, even prior to annexation, by the time Japan gained decisive influence over the 
peninsula in the first few years of the twentieth century, the state of the long-ruling Choson 
dynasty was in disarray and decay.270 In certain aspects, then, Korean colonization differed from 
the colonial experience in Taiwan but the imperial motives were largely the same: to control it 
politically and transform it economically for the home country’s advantage through deliberate 
state intervention aimed at agricultural development and rapid industrial growth.271  
 
  Following a model pioneered in Taiwan, Korea was administered in such a way as to 
cater to the needs and interests of the Japanese motherland. By the beginning of the twentieth 
century Japan began to import food, presumably due to population pressure and lack of adequate 
resources at home.272 In particular, Japan faced shortages of rice and turned to colonial rice 
imports to solve this problem. Though rice production was also promoted in Taiwan, many of 
Japan’s rice imports began coming from Korea in the years after annexation. Although pre-
colonial Korea had not been a major producer of rice, its development potential was considered 
much higher than Japan’s and the production of rice for export to Japan was therefore 
encouraged.273 Imports from Korea steadily rose in the years following annexation and by 1914 
70 percent of Korean exports to Japan were foodstuffs, predominated largely by rice.274 W.G. 
Beasley has argued that, together with Taiwan, Korea provided Japan with almost all its imports 
of food and therefore “…played a major part in sustaining Japan’s modern economy by 
providing cheap food for a growing urban population”.275 
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 Though the importation of rice from Korea followed a similar logic to the expansion of 
sugar imports from Taiwan, they had a markedly different effect on the home market in Japan. 
Since sugarcane is not grown in Japan, sugar was a non-competing good that augmented the 
caloric intake of the home population without displacing domestic producers. Rice, however, 
was a different story. Since the rice crop was the single largest source of income for Japanese 
farmers, imports of large quantities of rice were damaging to the domestic producers; colonial 
rice was particularly problematic since it was allowed to flow freely into the Japanese market 
without the strict government controls placed on foreign rice. 276  Indeed, according to an 
extensive study carried out by Yujiro Hayami and V.W. Ruttan, colonial rice policy does seem to 
have depressed the price and income of farmers while also contributing to social disorders in the 
agricultural sector. However, this seems to have become significant only after 1920 and Hayami 
and Ruttan’s conclusion that colonial rice imports were responsible for Japanese agricultural 
stagnation applies only to the inter-war years; prior to this they concede that these imports 
contributed to industrial growth by keeping the industrial wage low and the return to capital high 
without causing a serious drain on foreign exchange. 277  In the period under consideration, 
therefore, it seems that agricultural imports made the industrialization project at home easier 
while also feeding a large population, though in 1915 Korean rice imports were equivalent to 
only 2.1 percent of the total amount of rice produced in Japan; this number would rise to 13 
percent by 1935 but by this point Japan had undeniably taken off into modern economic 
growth.278 This is not to say that these imports were not vital in feeding a growing population but 
the population at that point was growing as a result of industrialization thus precluding the 
argument that imports and colonial policy at this time could have been a cause of industrial 
development.  
 
 In addition to being a producer of agricultural products, there was also talk of Korea 
serving as a migration destination in order to ease the Japanese population pressure. In the early 
years of Japanese influence in Korea it was thought that the peninsula was relatively unpopulated 
and would be able to support many settlers.279 Emigration was actively encouraged in order to 
mitigate overpopulation at home. However, in spite of this, the Japanese population in Korea 
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totaled only 650,000 in 1939, or less than 1 percent of the entire Japanese population.280 From 
these figures it is clear that Korea did not support a large Japanese immigrant population and 
colonial emigration policy could not have done much to ease pressures at home. It is true, of 
course, that some segments of the population migrated to places outside the Japanese imperial 
sphere, with Hawaii and the United States attracting the largest numbers.281 Though emigration 
as a whole surely had some effect at home, emigration within the larger imperial structure as a 
strategic means of easing population pressures at home appears to have been negligible. 
Amongst the reasons why so few people moved to Korea was the fact that the country was 
actually almost as densely populated as Japan and that untenanted fertile land was not easily 
available. 282  As such, it appears that while Korea as well as Taiwan could be utilized as 
agricultural producers and thus could provide some ghost acreage in terms of primary goods to 
the home market, they were not able to directly absorb large amounts of labor as a quick fix to 
Japanese population problems.  
 
 It is clear that Japan used her colonies for raw materials, particularly agricultural goods to 
feed her growing population at home. This echoes the role of islands such as Jamaica and 
Barbados as suppliers of sugar to England. Cotton and supplies of raw cotton from the American 
colonies also figured prominently into the British imperial model; cotton and textiles however 
played a relatively less important role in the exchange between Japan and her East Asian 
possessions.283 In any case, it seems that the Japanese colonies did provide some sort of ghost 
acreage to the home economy, especially in rice and sugar. The question remains though, 
whether this can be convincingly compared with the ghost acreage cited for Britain. The 
Japanese colonies were to some extent seriously exploited with exports of Korean rice reportedly 
increasing more than production, leading to a drop in overall calorie consumption in Korea in 
order to feed the home population.284 The supply of colonial rice was certainly important for 
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Japan, with Taiwan contributing 6 to 7 percent of the total Japanese rice supply in 1930285; 
accounting for the Korean rice supply would surely double this figure at the very least. These 
imports were surely significant and clearly helped to finance industrialization at home but were 
they really a necessary element for industrialization? It seems that the exploitation of the 
colonies developed in tandem with industrialization at home indicating that industrial 
development probably would have been slower without the benefit of the colonies, but it likely 
would have still occurred. The large-scale importation of goods seems to have really taken off 
around the 1920s, at which time Japan was already industrializing; this implies that rather than 
enabling the industrialization process to begin, the colonies instead were utilized to feed the 
increasing population that resulted from industrialization. As such, Korea and Taiwan appear to 
have functioned much more as a sustaining force than an enabling force in the process of 
Japanese industrialization.  
 
 To a large degree, the Japanese quest for colonies followed a model pioneered by 
European powers. After a long period of relative isolation, Japan awoke to a world in which it 
seemed that modernity and industrial success were predicated upon an ability to acquire and 
effectively administer foreign possessions. 286  To some extent, Japanese imperialism merely 
followed what appeared to have been a successful formula for industrialization; this however, 
does not mean that colonization was imperative to industrial development. Although the imports 
of primary goods came to be of growing importance, emigration to the colonies remained 
insignificant, such that pressure on the land at home in Japan was not much alleviated by the 
colonies. Korea and Taiwan were certainly instrumental in expediting and sustaining Japanese 
industrial growth; however, merely having colonies was not enough. Factors such as institutions 
and the role of the state were presumably just as, if not more, important. The acquisition and 
effective utilization of colonies did not happen by chance. Pomeranz and other Californians often 
refer to the windfall of the colonies and the fortunate location of coal; while coal and colonies 
surely were important, both for Japan as well as for Britain, they alone do not seem to adequately 
explain Japanese industrialization. In the next chapter I will attempt to identify elements that are 
missing from the Californian explanation in regards to providing a comprehensive understanding 
of industrial development in Japan.   
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7.  WHAT THE CALIFORNIANS MISSED 
From the preceding analysis it has become clear that both coal and colonies did play some role in 
Japanese industrialization; however, it’s more than a small stretch to make the claim that these 
made the ultimate difference. The existence of a pre-modern coal sector and a skilled labor force 
surely was pivotal in the speed and ease of adaption of new techniques and technology once the 
Japanese ports were opened, but to follow the Pomeranzian claim that colonies and coal could 
have been the deciding factor also in Japanese industrialization would be far-fetched. Coal, as we 
have seen, was mined in Japan and the coal sector was relatively developed for the pre-modern 
world in which it operated; however, coal was not developed on a large scale and, despite water 
problems similar to those found in English mines, did not produce the steam engine or other 
steam-related technology. Colonies, on the other hand, appear to have been more a consequence 
than a cause of industrialization, arising largely out of the European nationalist sentiment that 
Japan was attempting to emulate287 , and becoming really profitable only after take-off into 
modern economic growth had begun. 
 
 Up until this point there have been numerous mentions of Japan embarking on a course 
toward modern economic growth without any indication of what this really means. The term 
“take-off” is typically employed in reference to the Rostovian model in which W.W. Rostow 
outlines his stages of economic growth. These five stages include the traditional society, the pre-
conditions for take-off, the take-off, the drive to maturity and lastly, the age of high mass 
consumption. The criticisms of this model as attempting a historical linear explanation of 
economic growth are not of concern here, though these and many other criticisms surely exist. 
What is of concern is the definition of an economic take-off into self-sustained growth and what 
this means for Japan. It is difficult to determine the importance of Japanese colonialism without 
first having some idea of what stage Japan was in. Take-off is called by Rostow “…the great 
watershed in the life of modern economies”288 and is defined as: 
 …the interval when the old blocks and resistances to steady growth are finally overcome.  
The forces making for economic progress, which yielded limited bursts and enclaves of 
modern activity, expand and come to dominate society. Growth becomes its normal 
condition.289 
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According to his criteria for sustained economic growth, which will be explained in somewhat 
further though not exhaustive detail later, Rostow originally dated the Japanese take-off as 
having taken place sometime between 1878-1900,290 but revised the date to 1885-1905 in a later 
publication.291 The determination of these take-off dates is based on three main criteria, which 
Rostow outlines as follows: first, there must be a rise in the rate of productive investment from 
5% or less to over 10% of national income; second, the development of one or more substantial 
manufacturing sectors, with a high rate of growth; and third, the quick emergence of a political, 
social, and institutional framework which exploits impulses to expansion in the modern sector 
and the potential external economy effects of the take-off which gives growth an on-going 
character.292 Consequently, Japanese take-off appears to have occurred within the first few years 
of the twentieth century in accordance with this model, followed by the drive to technological 
maturity which occurred between 1905 and 1941.293 The colonies and the agricultural policies 
instituted there were an important factor in sustaining the take-off and spurring the drive toward 
economic maturity, but there seem to be some underlying factors that receive short shrift from 
the Californians, yet which were essential for Japanese take-off.  
 
 The purpose here is not to give a conclusive explanation of Japanese industrialization or 
take-off requirements but rather to point out some factors that seem to be neglected in the 
California theory. Given the Californian assessment of the Malthusian restraints which held back 
Chinese industrialization, it is difficult within this framework to explain the Japanese case. 
Considering the population and land pressure faced by Japan, which appears to have been even 
worse than in China, Japan should theoretically also have been destined for a path of involution 
and stagnation. Certainly Japan managed to acquire some colonies which provided much-needed 
slack in the early twentieth century; however, this really only became relevant after the take-off 
was already underway and in any case Japan did not come into her colonies through sheer luck 
or dumb fortune. Japan had to win two wars against formidable opponents in order to establish 
her rule over Taiwan, Korea, and later Manchuria and parts of China. This indicates that there 
were some internal dynamics already prior to 1895 which put Japan on a path toward imperial 
success and sustained economic growth.  
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 Though not entirely neglected, Pomeranz pays fairly little attention to the importance of 
institutions in his explanation of the great divergence. He does concede, however, that in the 
textile sector and in terms of the proletarian migration option “…European institutions may have 
been more conducive to migration that would (theoretically) create equilibria by moving people 
from labor-glutted areas to capital-rich ones”.294 A few sentences prior to this, though, Pomeranz 
also mentions the English Poor Laws as having had an inhibiting effect on the migration ability 
of large portions of the English population.295  The key distinction here may be between Europe 
and England, terms which Pomeranz frequently fails to properly define and appears to use inter-
changeably as it suits him. Regardless, Pomeranz misses the mark by confusingly implying that 
European institutions generally were more favorable toward labor mobility while specifically 
England had certain laws which inhibited this mobility more than in other parts of Europe. From 
this arises a seemingly insurmountable contradiction: England was indisputably the first country 
to industrialize so the argument of European institutions aiding labor mobility falls mute under 
the claim that the Poor Laws inhibited the same. However, while it is true that Poor Laws were 
technically limited to a person’s parish of settlement, research by Peter Solar has shown that 
many English parishes, especially in industrial areas, granted relief even to people without legal 
entitlements and that continental relief, to the extent it existed, was circumscribed by far less 
flexible settlement laws.296 Additionally, more important than the question of labor mobility in a 
strictly geographic sense is the fact that the English Poor Law was comprehensive, national, and 
decreased the risk of working for wages. The result of this was that people felt protected from 
destitution and less urgently felt the need to obtain access to land.297 It seems that this aspect of 
the Poor Laws made for conditions in England that were quite distinct from elsewhere, not only 
globally but also within Europe and yet it does not garner even a mention in Pomeranz’s 
explanation. Overall, Pomeranz takes an overwhelmingly demographic and ecological approach 
to the question of industrialization, affording very little mention of institutions, technology or the 
role of the state in driving economic expansion and growth.  
 
 In reality, successful industrialization was undoubtedly due to many factors coalescing in 
a certain way and at a certain time in history. Amongst these, there are some factors that don’t 
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figure largely into the Californian analysis but deserve further attention. These include points 
such as institutions and property rights which are most prominently championed by Douglass 
North and Robert Thomas. In their institutionally-based analysis of European economic 
development, North and Thomas end their study in the eighteenth century with the claim that “by 
that time a structure of property rights had developed in the Netherlands and England which 
provided the inducements required to encourage innovation and the consequent industrialization. 
The industrial revolution was not the source of modern economic growth. It was the outcome of 
raising the private rate of return on developing new techniques and applying them to the 
production process”. 298  This type of analysis is almost completely absent in Californian 
comparisons of the British and Chinese trajectories. Roy Bin Wong makes some mention of the 
lack of institutions in China after 1800 hindering economic growth, stating that “industrial 
capitalism in China possessed neither the institutional structures nor the capital to transform 
large parts of the country”.299 In a claim closely mirroring Pomeranz’s line of reasoning, Bin 
Wong cites lack of institutional structures and financial institutions in China as a cause for the 
relatively late and contingent divergence between China and Western Europe. Shifting our focus 
to Japan, in what way might institutions have played a vital role in industrialization? 
 
 One fundamental institutional reform that pre-dated not only the Sino-Japanese war but 
also even the possibility, let alone the reality, of imperial conquests was the Land Tax Reform in 
1873. The tax reform was intended to re-distribute the relative gross product of agriculture which 
previously had been split such that the ruling feudal class averaged around 37 percent while the 
remainder was divided between landowners and cultivators in a rough proportion of 4 to 6; the 
Land Tax Reform re-distributed this under a formula in which 34 percent of the gross product 
would go to the government as tax, 34 percent went to the owner, and the remaining 32 percent 
to the tenant.300 This re-distribution had some important effects that laid some of the ground-
work for the era of industrialization that soon followed. Some of the more significant of these 
were that, although the land tax rate at first appeared to be exorbitant, it was a fixed rate which 
eventually lost its severity both through a rise in prices and in the productivity of the rice crop, 
such that what began as a tax of 34 percent of the gross value of the crop had been reduced to 12 
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percent by 1878.301 Being a flat rate helped motivate the cultivators because an increase in 
productivity would lessen the relative tax burden, and the fact that this reform happened to 
coincide with a period of inflation further reduced the severity of the tax and increased the 
possibilities for profit.302 Additionally, the land tax revenue could be used by the government as 
a basis for issuing bonds, including industrial bonds—this meant that the Meiji government was 
able to channel some of the surplus directly into productive investment and it allowed for deficit 
financing for creating new industries.303 Although the land tax reform also had a wide-reaching 
negative impact on those peasants who could not pay the initially high tax, it did provide 
incentives to increase productivity since a guaranteed flat tax meant that extra profits from 
increased production accrued to the landowners rather than to the government. In line with 
research conducted by Sudipto Mundle, it can be seen that a system such as this, in which the 
surplus producer is able to appropriate the gains in productivity, is a viable agrarian basis for 
industrialization.304 Additionally, the portion of the gross value that goes to the government 
establishes a revenue base for investment in industrial production. 
 
 Whereas the export sector is often heralded as leading economic growth, which in turn 
directs attention toward the importance of colonies, studies by Okawa and Rosovsky have shown 
that throughout the period of modern economic growth in Japan, domestic demand has always 
accounted for 75 to 80 percent of aggregate demand, leading them to conclude that it is not 
exports that led growth but conversely domestic economic growth which led exports.305 This is 
substantiated also by Richard Grabowski who points out that “…successful export generally 
requires the mastery and adaptation of new technology. If such mastery and adaptation can be 
enhanced only by practical experience in applying and utilizing the technology, it will be 
domestic demand which is the key to long-run export success. In other words, production for the 
domestic market would be a necessary prerequisite before foreign markets could be successfully 
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penetrated”.306  Since the main market for manufactured goods in early industrialization was 
typically the agricultural sector, a successful agricultural revolution may be critical for successful 
import substitution industrialization. 307  The agricultural modifications instituted through the 
Land Tax Reform helped to establish the advanced agricultural base upon which industrialization 
could and would then thrive. The agricultural sector provided export earnings and import 
substitutes which then helped in acquiring machinery and raw materials from abroad. 308 
Additionally, the land tax reform and incentives toward productivity increases would have kept 
relative food prices low such that a greater share of income could be devoted to the purchase of 
manufactured goods.309 In this manner, the institutional reform established through the land tax 
provided funds for the government while also expanding the domestic market, which in turn 
would have driven export growth. Even if following this argument to its logical end places too 
much emphasis on the importance of agrarian reform, it at least correctly points out that such 
institutional underpinnings were at least as, and probably more, important than coal and colonies 
in establishing the foundations for successful industrialization in Japan.  
 
 Entangled with this argument is the availability of cheap labor to work in factories once 
the factory system came to be wide-spread. Although the tax burden fell significantly in the years 
following the tax reform, there were numerous small-sized landowners who could not survive the 
initial severity of the tax and were forced to sell their land and become tenant farmers; the 
average peasant also continued to live in near subsistence conditions.310 This created a class of 
cheap laborers, often young women from impoverished rural families, who supplemented the 
family income by working in textile factories or engaging in some form of proto-
industrialization.311 As already seen in chapter 5, by-employment in the textile industry was 
widespread and, considering that cotton was a leading sector in the Japanese economy from 
around 1885 until 1905, the availability of cheap employment was surely important in 
profitability and the consequent ability of this sector to compete even in the domestic market 
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against imports from Britain and India.312 Low wages then also helped to establish Japanese 
exports, which were aided by a policy of dumping and expansionist military policy towards the 
Asian continent.313 Again, it is clear that the imperial expansion was an outgrowth of national 
policy (both for national strength and to promote the import/export sector) once the internal 
dynamics were already in place.  Indeed, Meiji institutions played no small part in this. 
 
 It can also be argued that these agrarian reforms were not an abrupt change instituted 
under the new Meiji government and breaking entirely with the past. As already described in 
chapter 4, there had been a long process of agricultural evolution and improvements already in 
the Tokugawa period. The major political changes that took place during the Meiji Restoration 
naturally have their place in the historical context of Japanese development; however, the 
foundation upon which these institutional and political changes would be based was already 
being put in place in the Tokugawa period. In his insightful comparison of Japanese and Indian 
industrialization, Sudipto Mundle draws the conclusion that the industrial revolution in Britain, 
as in Japan, was the outcome of a long agrarian revolution; India, by contrast, attempted to 
implement a similar strategy of state-led industrialization as that found in Japan, but in the 
context of a much less developed agrarian structure which, for Mundle, accounts for the differing 
success rates.314 Regardless of the ultimate validity of this claim, there undeniably was a long 
precedence of agricultural and land-productivity improvements tracing back to the Tokugawa 
period which surely played a role in the speed of Japan’s transition from a pre-modern 
agricultural society to a society well on the path toward industrialization and mass consumption 
in the space of a tumultuous but impressive fifty years.  
 
 Also of note in Mundle’s comparison of Japan and India is his characterization of their 
common strategy of industrialization as “state-led”. Although the involvement of the Japanese 
state in actively pursuing industrialization is almost too obvious, the role of the state is a point 
not carefully considered within the California tradition and therefore requires some attention here. 
Naturally, Japanese and British industrialization occurred in two entirely different environments. 
Britain, as the first industrializer, did not have any examples to follow nor could she have 
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guessed the likely outcome of certain actions or policies. Japan, on the other hand, was able to 
look to the West for precedence and could model her industrial strategy after what appeared to 
have led to success for other countries in the past. Regardless of this temporal and situational 
difference, it is likely that the motives and internal dynamics of the state, even if less deliberate 
than in Japan, may also have been critical in the British divergence from China. This is a point 
not much acknowledged by the Californians, and the juxtaposition of strong state involvement in 
the Japanese industrialization will hopefully serve to illustrate that the role of the state needs to 
be considered in an analysis in the impetus for industrialization.  
 
 In the wake of the forced opening of Japanese ports and the subsequent Restoration, a 
great concern for the newly established Meiji government was creating a strong nation able to 
fend off the dangers of invasion by foreign powers. The policy of seclusion, the relative lack of 
resources, and overwhelming interest in China had provided a barrier to outside intervention in 
the past but it was well understood that without decisive action the tables could quickly turn.315 
As a result of this looming threat, Japan embarked on an impressive mission of state-building 
with the goal of not only pre-empting foreign invasion but to stand on equal terms with European 
powers. 316  In this sense it is clear that the Japanese motive for industrialization was quite 
different from the British motive in that Japan had a clear model to emulate while the British did 
not. However, it will do well to remember that Britain existed within a highly competitive state 
system in which mercantilism 317  was order of the day and an inability to compete meant 
perishing into the oblivion of history. 318  In Western Europe, as in Japan, survival meant 
successful competition and consequently the need for a strong state to institute competitive 
policies. Amongst these, we see in Britain a policy of mercantilism and warfare which in turn led 
to institutions of taxation and parliament which may not have directly caused industrialization, 
but the objectives of the state in shaping policy in a certain direction and not in another cannot be 
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discounted as irrelevant.  
 
 In the Japanese case, the stated objective of the Meiji government was to strengthen the 
nation and join the ranks of the western powers.319 Thus, the state cannot be disregarded as an 
important driving force toward Japanese industrialization. During the early transition phase from 
the semi-feudal Tokugawa order to the modernizing Meiji period, Sydney Crawcour points to 
four major features that stand out. These are the adoption of modern economic growth as a 
national objective, institutional change, the creation of infrastructure, and the growth of the 
traditional economy, all of which he claims were responses to, or prompted by, contact with the 
West or followed Western models.320 Indeed, it is true that most of the Meiji policies followed 
Western models. This, however, is not very surprising. Much more relevant is the fact that all of 
these features, to which I would add also military might, were carried out under the impetus of 
government-guided policy. The Meiji government also was able to influence private investments 
which then gave the state influence in key areas of development and it continued the emphasis on 
literacy and education already in place during Tokugawa times; this created a literate and 
educated labor force which would prove crucial for later industrialization.321 The Japanese case 
thus clearly illustrates that the state can play a vital role in encouraging industrialization. Though 
the purpose here is merely to use Japan as a case study to illuminate points of consideration that 
are lacking in the Californian analysis and not to actually delve deeply into the British or Chinese 
cases, the implication is of course that the role of the British state differed in some critical ways 
from the state in China, thus accounting, at least in part, for the very different paths these two 
countries found themselves on by the nineteenth century.  
 
 Technology also gets comparatively little mention from the Californians. The question of 
technology has already been touched upon in our analysis of Japanese agricultural improvements 
as well as having been faintly hinted at in our discussion of the different energy paths upon 
which different societies found themselves. It is not the existence of technology in itself that is 
really important though, but rather the factors that drive technological innovation. These factors 
are manifold, cutting across cultural and institutional lines with certain institutions and 
                                                          
319
 Howe, The Origins of Japanese Trade Supremacy, p. 90. 
320
 Crawcour, “The Tokugawa Period and Japan's Preparation for Modern Economic Growth,” p. 116. 
321
 Ibid., pp. 121-122. 
79 
 
government policies enabling different cultures that are more or less open to invention and 
technological innovation. For W.W. Rostow, for example, the distinguishing characteristic of the 
industrial revolution was the systematic, regular, and progressive application of science and 
technology to the production of goods and services.322 David Landes also devotes a chapter of 
his book to invention and innovation, citing Judeo-Christian traditions as well as the free market 
for reasons why inventions were cumulative and fast-spreading in Europe while in China they 
languished in a “…weird pattern of isolated initiatives and Sisyphean discontinuities”. 323 
Ultimately, these arguments come down to culture and the role of the state. Cultural explanations 
are completely avoided in Californian analyses. While Landes’ Judeo-Christian argument 
doesn’t make much sense in the Japanese context, Japan does seem to have been open and 
receptive to new technologies in a way that other cultures, such as perhaps China, were not. With 
the opening of the ports, Japan embraced the backlog of foreign technological advancements and 
embarked on a mission to adapt and improve upon these new techniques.324 In this, Japan was 
presumably able to learn from China’s mistakes and recognized that opening herself up to 
Western techniques and adapting them on her own terms was a far wiser course of action than 
resistance and withdrawal.  
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8.  CONCLUSION 
The question of fundamental requirements essential for industrialization and the extent to which 
Japan fits into the western development pattern is a debate unlikely to be satisfactorily resolved 
anytime soon. This does not mean, however, that such scholarly pursuits are not worthwhile. 
Indeed it is the very complexity of the problem which makes it a compelling topic for on-going 
research and discussion. The success of certain parts of the world in breaking away from pre-
modern stagnation into an era of sustained and continuing economic growth has led to the 
publication of many thousands of tomes, engaging some of the most brilliant minds of the past 
two and a half centuries. The California School of writers marks an important break within what 
was, and to some degree still is, a heavily euro-centric tradition of understanding 
industrialization. These writers have made significant strides in broadening the field of research 
and introducing new perspectives from which to understand the modern world. Due in large part 
to these writers, as well as to those writing within the framework of dependency theory or world-
systems theory, it is no longer possible to explain the modern, industrialized world through 
Europe alone. Ultimately, it is true, any analysis of industrialization must confront the question 
of Europe and why it was there that industrialization began. However, to ignore the rest of the 
world is wholly inadequate and insufficient for those writing in the wake of the California 
School which so powerfully, and oftentimes very convincingly, positions China at the center of 
the debate while relegating Europe for the most part to the side-lines. 
 
 Although the Californians have undoubtedly had an enormous impact on the field of 
economic history, a reorientation towards Asia is not entirely unproblematic. China lies at the 
core of this re-conceptualized approach which deals only in a very insignificant and unsystematic 
way with the country of Japan. This, then, eventually brings us to the problem at the heart of this 
paper: if China was such a powerful force in Asia, why did Japan industrialize first? Can we 
understand Japanese industrialization within this context and if so, how? This paper has sought 
to provide a systematic analysis of the main elements that seem to have been deciding factors for 
writers within the Californian tradition.  
 
 Ecological factors figure most prominently into the works of Kenneth Pomeranz, Andre 
Gunder Frank, Roy Bin Wong, and other writers within this school of thought. In following this 
approach, the main units of analysis applied in this paper to Japan have also been ecological. The 
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dense population of the Japanese archipelago made it at least as likely a contender for 
Malthusian checks as China or Britain. In fact, Japan appears to have had a much greater 
population working on an area of significantly less arable land than either its Asian neighbor or 
its European counterpart, meaning that it should have been beset by greater involution and more 
intensive Malthusian pressures than either China or Britain. This would have made Japanese 
industrialization all the more surprising. Indeed, famine and pestilence offer some indication of 
positive Malthusian checks in Tokugawa Japan, but neither led to massive population drops. 
Rather, the archipelago maintained a stable population throughout much of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. This does not mean that Japan was not heavily populated or that there was 
no evidence of land exhaustion; indeed there was. However, fertility research suggests that the 
population was carefully controlled through family structure and practices such as abortion and 
infanticide—practices reportedly also prevalent in China. It is therefore difficult to determine to 
what extent the Japanese population, as opposed to the Chinese or British population, was truly 
kept in check by exogenous Malthusian forces and to what extent it was consciously controlled 
in order to prevent total resource exhaustion and collision with the Malthusian ceiling. It appears 
that although Japan was densely populated, it was not to the point of a drastically reduced 
standard of living or serious population decline. No such trade-off is evident. Au contraire, the 
Japanese standard of living in the pre-modern era seems to have been as high, and by some 
measures even higher, than standards of living in Western Europe.  In this way, Japan very 
closely mirrors the Californian argument that China also maintained a large population at a high 
standard of living. Additionally, Japan’s rice agriculture and reliance on labor over capital were 
also similar to conditions in China thus providing an inadequate explanation of industrial success 
and failure in the two respective countries. 
 
 Kenneth Pomeranz explains the divergence between Britain and China as having been a 
result of fortuitous coal deposits and a colonial windfall for Britain. This argument in itself 
largely overlooks the colossal investments required to not only obtain but more importantly to 
maintain colonies, thus placing in doubt how much of a windfall the British colonial empire 
really was. It becomes even more tenuous in light of the fact that China had advanced knowledge 
of mining and coal extraction already centuries earlier but failed to develop steam technology. 
Tokugawa Japan also had an endogenous coal-mining industry faced with many of the same 
drainage problems as Britain, but solved these problems in a markedly different manner. Merely 
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having coal and some extraction capabilities was evidently not enough to harness the power of 
kinetic energy and develop that all-important precursor to industrialization, the steam engine.   
 
 Applying the colonial ghost acreage argument to Japan also proves problematic. Japan 
did indeed have colonies, but these were nowhere near as vast or as unpopulated (or depopulated 
as the case may be) as the British colonies in the Americas. The British were able to incorporate 
their colonies into a comprehensive system of production that utilized the land and capacity of 
the Americas for supplying raw materials. This did not come cheap, either in terms of labor or in 
terms of capital investment. However, it did provide an escape from the land-base at home and 
the opportunity to direct colonial production toward the needs and demands of the home country. 
According to calculations by Pomeranz, the ghost acreage gained through the colonies was 
enormous and decisive, providing not only raw materials scarce at home but also later becoming 
a stable market for the absorption of British manufactures. Although Japan also joined the 
imperial game and used her colonies in Taiwan and Korea for agricultural production, it is 
difficult to argue that these colonies were critical to the successful industrialization of Japan.  
 
 The controversy over the necessity of Japanese imperialism in East Asia is an on-going 
debate. It is true that Manchuria was certainly important for Japanese foreign and military policy 
and largely shaped East Asian politics in the run-up to the Second World War. However, by the 
time Japan had gained a foothold in Manchuria, it had for all intents and purposes already 
reached and exceeded its take-off point into sustained economic growth. As such, Manchuria 
was more an out-growth of industrialization than a driving force. Taiwan and Korea, on the other 
hand, may be considered to have been more pertinent in providing momentum for the definitive 
break-away from Smithian growth. Taiwan in particular served as the model for Japanese 
imperialism, becoming an important producer of sugar for the home economy. Although only 
informally a part of the Japanese imperial sphere until 1910, Korea also became integrated into 
the colonial empire as a producer and net exporter of rice to the home market. Imports from both 
Taiwan and Korea surely were important for sustaining the Japanese take-off into modern 
economic growth, but it would be highly suspect to claim that they enabled take-off in the first 
place. Japan had won two wars against major powers in order to even acquire these possessions, 
and by the time they became really significant to the Japanese economy in the second and third 
decades of the twentieth century, Japan had almost certainly reached and gone beyond the point 
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of take-off.  
 
 Although coal and colonies do not appear to have been decisive for Japan, they are also 
not irrelevant. Japan had an endogenous coal industry upon which it could build once steam 
power became available after foreign intervention forced the opening of Japanese ports. As such, 
though neither one of these elements can be said to have been a direct cause of industrialization, 
they also cannot be discounted as playing no part in the process. The existing coal industry 
coupled with a skilled and able labor force may have provided a basic foundation upon which 
industrialization could build while raw food and material imports from the colonies surely 
sustained and expedited economic growth. However, other factors, which are largely 
marginalized by the Californians, likely played a more important role not just in Japanese 
industrialization but in industrialization as a whole.  
 
 Although it will have become fairly clear by this point that the units of analysis utilized 
by the California School are not entirely adequate in explaining the Japanese case, neither is it 
simple to make a clear and concise assessment of what is missing. The explanation of a lack is 
inherently fraught with complexities and difficulties in that it radically broadens the topic and 
requires a systematically logical appraisal of what elements are truly critical from amongst any 
plethora of potentially lacking features. The perilousness of such an exercise is fairly obvious—it 
can easily become messy and overwhelming. However, this alone does not mean that it shouldn’t 
be attempted. Indeed, if we are to conclude that the California School does not entirely explain 
the case of Japan, then there must be some attempt to identify the missing ingredients. Though 
this could take many forms, in the end, the role of the state seems to be a point of fundamental 
importance that is not seriously addressed by the Californian writers.  
 
 Essentially all of the missing elements highlighted in chapter 7 can be boiled in some 
form or another down to the state and the degree to which certain policies were either 
encouraged or inhibited. Though it is not specifically addressed, the disruption of the Meiji 
Revolution is itself also an important factor in Japanese developed which has no equivalent 
counterpart in Chinese history. Many of the early industrialization processes were a continuation 
of Tokugawa conditions; however, the ability of the Japanese state to re-direct itself and embark 
on a purposeful and deliberate path towards industrialization was both instrumental and unique. 
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Although the conditions of the Meiji era have not been discussed in this work, a thorough 
understanding of how Japanese industrialization came about will inevitably lead to strength of 
the Meiji leadership, the stated policy of modernization, and the existence of a skilled 
bureaucracy to guide the process of transitioning and building upon the Tokugawa agrarian and 
social structures that were already in place as a solid development foundation.  
 
 Having defined some aspects that appear to be lacking when applying the California 
Theory to Japan, we come now to a crucial point of difference: that of being the first 
industrializer as opposed to merely catching up. Ultimately, the question boils down to whether 
Japan could have feasibly been the first or if the existence of some precedential model was 
critical to Japanese success. In the end, though there is some incongruity in the argument that 
China and the West only truly began to diverge after 1800, what the Californians are correct 
about is that industrialization was nowhere inevitable. However, even if not inevitable, I believe 
we can point to some areas of the world which were more likely to achieve and sustain a take-off 
into modern economic growth than others.  
 
 Understanding the various paths to industrialization requires an analytic distinction 
between being first and catching up. Japan seems to have had a fairly solid foundation for catch-
up and was therefore a more likely candidate for early industrialization. The agrarian structure 
coupled with a bureaucratic, institutional and political apparatus capable of affecting change 
within a highly educated and homogenous populous provided a springboard to economic growth 
not available elsewhere. Actual industrialization, however, only followed on the heels of markets 
being opened to competition and the formation of the Meiji government which made 
modernization a national priority. Britain, on the other hand, industrialized without any clear 
precedence or stated modernization goal. Rather, a convergence of factors, which surely included 
colonial mercantilism as well as availability and utilization of coal deposits, allowed Britain to 
be the first country to reach the take-off phase.  
 
 It is my opinion that Japan could not have been the first industrial country. Without 
interaction and competition with global players, much of the impetus for industrialization would 
have been missing. Granted, Tokugawa Japan did conduct some trade with her Asian neighbors 
as well as with the Netherlands; this was rather minimal however, and certainly negligible when 
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compared with trade relations between other parts of the world. Japan had an endogenous coal 
industry which functioned adequately and which solved its problems in a sufficient manner, 
though not in a manner that harnessed kinetic energy and effectively changed the prevalent mode 
of production. It is improbable that this would have changed significantly without some 
exogenous shock or without reforms that would have made Japan resemble England more 
closely. Colonies also were a part of Japan’s plan to emulate the West and could never have been 
established within the isolationist policy of the Tokugawa period. Of course, it is possible that 
Japan could have come out of isolation of her own volition and somehow managed to 
industrialize. However, such a counter-factual scenario would be extremely difficult to construct 
in a logical and meaningful manner. In any case, the analytical dichotomy between 
understanding the difference between the first industrializer and all other industrializers is fertile 
grounds for new and continuing research that may very well expand our understanding of 
industrialization in general and how Japan fits into this larger picture. 
 
 While Japan appears to have had the necessary groundwork for a successful catch-up in 
the late nineteenth century, China was another story altogether. Although the Californians are not 
wrong in pointing to China as an important player in the pre-modern economy, it seems that 
China was on the decline already well before the British appeared. The state appears to have 
been too weak to effectively keep the British out, even if they were largely barred from the 
interior and relegated to trading in the coastal ports--when it came to the point of military 
intervention, the Chinese were no match for the British.325 The state of the coal industry, which 
had also massively declined from its height in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, is another 
indication of China’s regressive trajectory relative to other regions in the world. Therefore, even 
after once the potential of steam power had been discovered and harnessed in Britain, its 
                                                          
325
 Military conflict came to a head over the issue of opium during the First Opium War from 1839—1842, which 
England handily won. However, this conflict came about more over the realization that millions of taels of silver 
were flowing out of China than over a direct concern about the effects of opium. Ultimately, the outrage over 
opium was a question of economics. The argument that China may have been severely weakened either socially or 
militarily by the British-controlled opium inflow into the country is fairly weak. Opium existed in China both prior 
to and following the British presence, with production peaking at the beginning of the twentieth century, long 
after the British had moved on to other pursuits. Opium did have a large financial impact on China and certainly led 
to internal discord; however, the fact that the Chinese could not keep the British out in first place nor effectively 
control the import of opium indicate that this was a consequence rather than a symptom of Chinese decline. For 
more, see Opium, Empire, and the Global Political Economy by Karl Trocki or Wong, Roy Bing, “Opium and Modern 
Chinese State-Making”, In: Brook, Timothy and Wakabayashi, Bob Tadashi (eds.), Opium Regimes: China, Britain, 
and Japan, 1839-1852.  
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introduction into China did not result in a successful technology transfer and a subsequent catch-
up phase. China lacked the institutions and the fundamental political structure to make this kind 
of transition in the way that Japan did. Ultimately it seems then that although industrialization 
was nowhere inevitable or foreseeable, some place in Western Europe was much more likely to 
achieve this break-through than China, which for all her ability to sustain an incredibly large 
population at a high standard of living had a fairly weak state and seems to have been moving 
away from technological innovation. Japan also would have been an unlikely candidate for first 
industrialization lacking some of the necessary pre-conditions for take-off without policy geared 
directly at achieving this goal; however, Japan did have a strong state as well as the 
technological and institutional foundations for successful technology and best practice transfers 
which made her a viable candidate for take-off and catch-up, a feat achieved within the first few 
decades of the twentieth century.   
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